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Abstract
Although a number of theoretical studies explain empirical puzzles in
ﬁnance with ambiguity aversion, it is not a given that individual ambiguity
attitudes survive in markets. In fact, despite ample evidence of ambiguity
aversion in individual decision making, most studies ﬁnd no or only limited
ambiguity aversion in experimental ﬁnancial markets, even when they
exclude arbitrage. We argue that ambiguity eﬀects in markets depend on
market feedback and on a suﬃciently strong bias toward ambiguity among
the participants. Accordingly, we ﬁnd signiﬁcant ambiguity eﬀects in low-
feedback call markets for assets that provoke high ambiguity aversion, but
no ambiguity eﬀects in high-feedback double auctions.
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1 Introduction
Many real-life decisions are characterized by ambiguity, in which we lack
important information such as the objective probabilities of the relevant states.
Keynes (1921) proposed a simple thought experiment to illustrate the eﬀects of
ambiguity.
Imagine [...] the two cases following of balls drawn from an
urn. In each case we require the probability of drawing a white ball;
in the ﬁrst case we know that the urn contains black and white in
equal proportions; in the second case the proportions of each color is
unknown, and each ball is as likely to be black as white. It is evident
that in either case the probability of drawing a white ball is 1/2, but
that the weight of the argument in favor of this conclusion is greater
in the ﬁrst case. (Keynes, 1921, Chapter VI.6)1
Ellsberg (1961) used this experimental design, commonly referred to as the '2-
color Ellsberg urn' to show that a preference for the risky urn (with measurable
probabilities) over the ambiguous urn (with immeasurable probabilities) violates
the Subjective Expected Utility Theory and the Sure-thing Principle of the
Savage axioms (Savage, 1954). Since then a large body of individual choice
experiments have conﬁrmed that, on average, decision makers are 'ambiguity
averse' when confronted with the above-quoted choice.2 In a recent survey
of the experimental literature, Trautmann and Van De Kuilen (forthcoming)
conclude that there is clear evidence that on the average, and across various
elicitation methods, ambiguity aversion is the typical qualitative ﬁnding.
Ambiguity aversion is a possible cause for a number of empirical puzzles in
ﬁnancial economics, which expected utility theory would consider to be (behav-
ioral) anomalies. After the development of several non-expected utility models
of individual decision making that considered ambiguity attitudes (e.g., Gilboa
and Schmeidler, 1989; Ghirardato et al., 2004; Klibanoﬀ et al., 2005; Nau, 2006),
a growing number of theoretical papers incorporated ambiguity aversion into
market models to explain long-standing anomalies in ﬁnance, like the equity
premium puzzle (Epstein and Wang, 1994; Maenhout, 2004; Cao et al., 2005;
Leippold et al., 2008), portfolio inertia (Epstein and Wang, 1994; Illeditsch,
2011), the familiarity bias and the home bias in investments (Uppal and Wang,
2003; Huang, 2007; Cao et al., 2011), ampliﬁcation eﬀects (Routledge and Zin,
1Keynes (1921)did not use the term ambiguity. Instead, he referred to 'the weight of
arguments', but was not sure about this concept. In fact, at the beginning of the Chapter
VI he writes: [A]fter much consideration I remain uncertain as to how much importance to
attach to it (Keynes, 1921, Chapter VI.1).
2For excellent overviews, see Camerer and Weber (1992), Wakker (2010), Etner et al.
(2012), and Trautmann and Van De Kuilen (forthcoming).
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2009; Guidolin and Rinaldi, 2010; Illeditsch, 2011), and asymmetric reactions to
good and bad news (Epstein and Schneider, 2008; Epstein et al., 2010; Illeditsch,
2011).
Yet, it is not a given that ambiguity aversion found in individual decision
making arises and even survives when market forces are at work. In markets,
decisions are no longer independent as they are subject to market feedback from
other traders. According to the eﬃcient market hypothesis (henceforth EMH,
Fama, 1970), market mechanisms and incentives should eliminate or at least
reduce behavioral biases and non-expected utility behavior, including ambiguity
aversion (Camerer, 1987). In fact, despite the burgeoning theoretical literature
and the promising explanatory potential of ambiguity aversion, no experimental
study has provided deﬁnite evidence of ambiguity aversion in experimental asset
markets (see section 2.1).
This study attempts to shed some light on the underlying reasons for the
discrepancy between ambiguity eﬀects in individual decision making and ex-
perimental asset markets.3 In doing so we propose and test an experimental
setup in which we give ambiguity eﬀects ample room to survive market forces.
In our search for possible underlying reasons, we start with the conditions of
the EMH under which (eﬃcient) market forces can eliminate ambiguity eﬀects.
The EMH rests on three, progressively weaker conditions, any one of which
will lead to market eﬃciency: (i) full rationality, (ii) independent deviations
from rationality, and (iii) arbitrage (Shleifer, 2003). We reformulate these three
conditions for market eﬃciency under ambiguity as follows: either (i) all mar-
ket participants are ambiguity neutral; or if (i) does not hold, (ii) a symmetric
distribution of ambiguity attitudes around ambiguity neutrality oﬀsets the inﬂu-
ence of ambiguity-averse and ambiguity-seeking market participants; or if both
(i) and (ii) do not hold, (iii) ambiguity-neutral traders take full advantage of
arbitrage opportunities.
Condition (i) can be ruled out by clear experimental evidence that individu-
als frequently violate ambiguity neutrality (see section 2). In many experiments,
condition (iii) also does not apply because even in the absence of arbitrage oppor-
tunities ambiguity aversion did not survive in experimental asset markets (see
section 2.1). However, in support of condition (ii), a number of recent studies
have found that the distribution of ambiguity attitudes is often quite symmetric
around neutrality (Halevy, 2007; Corgnet et al., 2013) including ambiguity seek-
ingness (e.g., Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985; Kahn and Sarin, 1988; Curley and
Yates, 1989) and a large percentage of people with highly inconsistent behavior
3With ambiguity eﬀects we generally refer to diﬀerences between, ceteris paribus, am-
biguous and risky assets with regard to asset prices, volatility, trading volume or ﬁnal asset
holdings.
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under ambiguity (Charness et al., 2013). In this paper, we therefore focus on
condition (ii) for two possible explanations of the empirical phenomenon that
ambiguity eﬀects are rarely found in experimental asset markets.
For our ﬁrst explanation, the group of people with inconsistent ambiguity
attitudes is of special interest. Experimental evidence on group behavior and
feedback shows that ambiguity neutrality has a 'persuasive edge' with a ten-
dency to de-bias ambiguity-seeking and ambiguity-averse individuals (Charness
et al., 2013; Keck et al., 2011). Market participants also use market prices to
update heterogeneous beliefs (Banerjee, 2011) and to coordinate price forecasts
(Hommes, 2011). We therefore conjecture that continuous market feedback may
de-bias participants with inconsistent ambiguity attitudes and may serve as a
reason why ambiguity aversion is rarely observed in experimental asset mar-
kets. To test our hypothesis on market feedback we compare the ambiguity
premium, i.e., the price diﬀerence between the risky asset and the ambiguous
asset between two market institutions: a continuous open-book double auction
with a high level of intra-period market feedback and a call market without
any intra-period market feedback.4 Note that the current literature primarily
administers double auction markets. We suggest that this market institution
provides suﬃcient feedback to wash out ambiguity eﬀects.
Our second explanation builds on evidence that ambiguity attitudes are very
heterogeneous and that the bias of the distribution toward ambiguity aversion
is, even in individual decision making, not very strong and is sometimes close to
neutral (Trautmann and Van De Kuilen, forthcoming). Based on the divergence
of opinions literature, which posits that optimists determine asset prices even if
they are in the minority (Miller, 1977), it is possible that the average bias toward
ambiguity aversion is not strong enough for ambiguity premiums to survive in
markets. To investigate the validity of this argument we increase the ambiguity
aversion in a market. We do this by comparing a medium objective winning
probability condition (50%) to a high objective probability condition (75%) in
a 2-color Ellsberg urn setup. This setup has already been proven to increase
average ambiguity aversion in individual decision-making tasks (e.g., Abdellaoui
et al. 2011). By applying this setup to ambiguous assets in markets, we expect
to observe only a small or a zero ambiguity premium in markets with a medium
winning probability but stronger ambiguity eﬀects for assets with a high winning
probability.
Our results suggest that limited market feedback (call market) in combi-
nation with a high winning probability (75%) leads to a signiﬁcant ambiguity
premium. Under this condition we observe further ambiguity eﬀects such that
for the ambiguous asset the number of executed trades is higher and ﬁnal asset
4In the call market traders are informed of the clearing price after the period.
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holdings are more dispersed. With double auction markets we ﬁnd no evidence
that ambiguity eﬀects occur under any winning probability, and we ﬁnd no
evidence that ambiguity eﬀects occur under a medium winning probability in-
dependent of the market institution.5 In response to our question stated in
the title, we conclude that ambiguity aversion can indeed arise and survive in
markets. But this statement only holds if market feedback is limited and if the
distribution of ambiguity attitudes among traders is suﬃciently biased toward
ambiguity aversion.
Our paper contributes to this literature by providing clear evidence of ambi-
guity eﬀects in markets. Most importantly, it identiﬁes two crucial antecedents
for their existence: the type of market institution and the distribution of ambi-
guity attitudes. In doing so, we add to the literature by not only considering the
ambiguity eﬀects within certain conditions (market institution, objective win-
ning probability) but also by directly comparing the eﬀects of ambiguity across
conditions (call market vs. double auction, medium vs. high objective winning
probability).
2 Theoretical and experimental background
2.1 Ambiguity eﬀects in experimental asset markets
Table 1 provides an overview of experimental asset market studies comparing
risky with ambiguous assets. To the best of our knowledge, Camerer and Kun-
reuther (1989) were the ﬁrst to study the ambiguity eﬀects in experimental
markets. They administered open outcry double auction markets for insurance
coverage against risky and ambiguous hazards that produced only losses. The
markets were separated without opportunities for arbitrage between risk and
ambiguity. The authors conclude that the eﬀects of ambiguity are rather mi-
nor and mixed  (p.287), with conﬂicting eﬀects on the number of insurance
contracts held at the end of trading and no eﬀects on prices.
Sarin and Weber (1993) explored a multitude of combinations of treatment
eﬀects, including uniform price auctions vs. open outcry double auctions, in-
dependent vs. simultaneous trading of risky and ambiguous assets (with arbi-
trage), experienced executives vs. students as traders, smaller vs. larger number
of trading periods, low vs. equal winning probabilities, and the framing of am-
biguity as nature vs. expert judgments. In all treatments, compound lotteries
were used to operationalize ambiguity. The study of Sarin and Weber (1993)
is demonstrative as the authors administered only one market per condition
5In a robustness check using the same source of ambiguity we ﬁnd signiﬁcant ambigu-
ity premiums in a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak individual decision-making task (Becker et al.,
1964).
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and report their results graphically. Market prices for ambiguous assets appear
to be below prices for risky assets in almost each period for a winning proba-
bility of 50%.6 Note, that this result is based on only two observations with
simultaneous trading of risky and ambiguous assets, which up to now have con-
stituted the entire experimental evidence on the simultaneous trading of risky
and ambiguous shares with independent outcomes.
Bossaerts et al. (2010) used a double auction environment to experimen-
tally investigate the simultaneous trading of three assets with state-dependent
dividends where state probabilities were either risky or ambiguous. Each asset
paid a ﬁxed dividend depending on the color of the ball drawn from a 3-color
Ellsberg urn in which the number of balls for the risky market is known but
the number of balls for the two risky assets is unknown. Thus, payoﬀs from the
risky and the ambiguous asset are not independent from each other. Further,
the composition of the balls in the urn changed over time as the balls were ran-
domly drawn without replacement. The authors acknowledge that the reduction
in ambiguity could be confounded with convergence to equilibrium, because it
is diﬃcultif not impossibleto assess when prices have settled down during
an experimental period  (p.1351). Moreover, their setup required the compu-
tation of state price/probability ratios with a number of assumptions on priors
and updating.7 Bossaerts et al. conclude that ambiguity aversion matters only
partially in markets: The predictions for portfolio choices seem quite robust
and well supported by the experimental data; the predictions for prices are less
robust (p.1355).
Kocher and Trautmann (2013) designed two separate ﬁrst-price sealed bid
market environments for risky and ambiguous assets and allowed subjects to self-
select into one of two mutually exclusive markets. Hence, arbitrage between risk
and ambiguity was not possible. Although less subjects chose to submit a bid
in the ambiguous market, Kocher and Trautmann (2013) found no diﬀerences
in the average transaction prices of risky and ambiguous assets.
In a recent study, Corgnet et al. (2013) modeled and experimentally tested
a market with ambiguity averse traders. In their model, the market is divided
into three categories: a proportion of rational traders who are ambiguity neu-
tral; a proportion of noise traders who buy or sell the asset independent of the
fundamentals; and a proportion of ambiguity-averse traders who maximize the
6The authors acknowledge that this is unexpected, as simultaneous auctions allow for arbi-
trage: It seems that a more transparent comparison between the unambiguous and ambiguous
assets leads to a greater diﬀerential in market prices (simultaneous versus independent) con-
trary to our expectation (Sarin and Weber, 1993, p.612).
7As there exists no theory for updating under ambiguity, the authors follow the simplest
approach and use uniform priors over the ambiguous states for the initial draw, updated by
Bayes' Rule for subsequent draws (p.1347). Although recent evidence points in the direction
of Bayesian learning under ambiguity, it also suggests that subjects might over-adjust/under-
adjust to contradictory/conﬁrming signals (Qiu and Weitzel, 2013).
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minimum expected utility over a set of multiple priors according to the maxmin
model of Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989).8 Corgnet et al. (2013) showed theoreti-
cally that if the proportion of ambiguity-averse traders is greater than zero, the
expected price of an ambiguous asset (with either a high or low dividend with
unknown probabilities) is strictly lower than in a comparable baseline treatment
with a risky asset. From the model, they predicted increased volatility, reduced
trading volumes, and a greater dispersion of ﬁnal asset holdings under ambi-
guity. Corgnet et al. (2013) experimentally tested their predictions in separate
double auction markets in which a unique asset, either risky or ambiguous, was
traded. Hence, arbitrage between risk and ambiguity was not possible. The
authors did not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant evidence for ambiguity premi-
ums or for ambiguity eﬀects on price volatility, trading volume or ﬁnal share
holdings.
As summed up at the bottom of table 1, none of the studies provides broad
and deﬁnite evidence of the ambiguity eﬀects in experimental asset markets. In
fact, the largest study to date, with 18 separate markets, ﬁnds no ambiguity
eﬀects (Corgnet et al., 2013); in line with Camerer and Kunreuther (1989) and
Kocher and Trautmann (2013).9
2.2 Development of hypotheses
As explained in the introduction, we isolate and focus on condition (ii) of the
EMH (independent deviations from rationality). Translated into our setting,
condition (ii) requires countervailing eﬀects of both ambiguity averse and am-
biguity seeking market participants. In fact, following this requirement, it is
not unlikely to ﬁnd substantial heterogeneity in ambiguity attitudes in both
directions: ambiguity aversion as well as ambiguity seekingness. Many stud-
ies provide evidence of ambiguity seekingness, especially, but not exclusively, if
the likelihood of winning is low (e.g., Einhorn and Hogarth, 1985; Curley and
Yates, 1989; Kahn and Sarin, 1988). Halevy (2007) reports a proportion of 35%
of ambiguity-seeking individuals. Moreover, the distribution of ambiguity atti-
tudes seems to be quite symmetric around neutrality. In their baseline condition
Charness et al. (2013) ﬁnd that 12% behave in accordance with ambiguity seek-
ingness; 60% of the subjects behave consistent with expected utility; 20% choose
randomly; and only 8% of the subjects exhibit ambiguity aversion. Corgnet et al.
8The model of Corgnet et al. (2013) is a modiﬁcation of Dow and da Costa Werlang (1992).
9For the sake of completeness: Chen et al. (2007) modeled and experimentally tested ﬁrst
and second price auctions in which the distribution of bidder valuations is unknown. They
rejected ambiguity aversion in favor of ambiguity seekingness and concluded that ambiguity
attitudes are context dependent. However, they consider two bidder 'markets' in which the
bidders have diﬀerent values for the asset while we consider markets with several traders and
the same fundamental value for all participants.
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(2013) report that 33% of their subjects are ambiguity seeking, while 35% are
ambiguity neutral, and 32% ambiguity averse. All these ambiguity attitudes
are measured individually. Thus, the whole distribution of ambiguity attitudes
is shifted toward aversion as ambiguity aversion is the typical ﬁnding for the
average individual (Trautmann and Van De Kuilen, forthcoming). However,
this should also apply to the average trader in a market.10 Hence, despite a
high heterogeneity of ambiguity attitudes which in principal supports condition
(ii), it is therefore very likely that the typical distribution of traders' attitudes
in markets is biased toward ambiguity aversion, too. This violation of condition
(ii) leads to our baseline hypothesis 1a on ambiguity premiums:
Hypothesis 1. (a) Market prices exhibit ambiguity premiums.
In its simplest form, hypothesis 1a refers to a biased representative agent (repre-
senting the average of individual expectations that are biased toward ambiguity
aversion). The same hypothesis, however, can also be developed from mod-
els with heterogeneous agents, of which some are ambiguity neutral and some
ambiguity averse (e.g., Corgnet et al., 2013; Bossaerts et al., 2010).11
However, facing conﬂicting experimental evidence where ambiguity premi-
ums are rarely found, we argue that there must be another factor that explains
why the same population of (on average) ambiguity-averse individuals produces
a higher average ambiguity premium in individual decision making than in mar-
kets. Heterogeneity in ambiguity attitudes that explicitly accounts for the in-
teraction between ambiguity-seeking and ambiguity-averse traders in ﬁnancial
markets has not yet been modeled (Caskey, 2009; Easley and O'Hara, 2009;
Ahn et al., 2011; Alonso and Prado, 2011; Corgnet et al., 2013; Guidolin and
Rinaldi, 2013). We therefore build on recent experimental insights regarding
ambiguity attitudes to develop two explanations, both of which are related to
condition (ii).
The ﬁrst explanation refers to the robustness of ambiguity attitudes, which
do not seem to be very stable or consistent within the same person. In fact,
Dürsch et al. (2013) ﬁnd that about 30% of their participants are inconsis-
tent in their choices across two repetitions of exactly the same ambiguity task.
Dimmock et al. (2012) report similar within-subject inconsistencies for 47% of
their participants. In an extensive study Stahl (forthcoming) categorizes more
than 60% as 'level-0' participants, who almost randomly make their decisions.
Corgnet et al. (2013) investigate whether the measure of individual ambiguity
10Bossaerts et al. (2010) report corresponding experimental evidence for heterogeneity in
ambiguity attitudes in markets.
11Corgnet et al. (2013) assume three trader types (ambiguity averse, neutral and noise
traders) while Bossaerts et al. (2010) illustratively develop a similar hypothesis with two
trader types (ambiguity-neutral trader, Type I, and ambiguity-averse trader, Type II).
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attitudes in individual decision-making tasks are able to explain individual trad-
ing behavior in markets. In line with the notion that the ambiguity attitudes of
a large percentage of subjects are not very stable and almost random Corgnet
et al. (2013) further ﬁnd that the previously elicited ambiguity attitudes do
not predict individual valuations, ﬁnal holdings, or the number of completed
transactions in markets with ambiguous assets.
The lack of robustness of individual ambiguity attitudes suggests that many
subjects are susceptible to external inﬂuences that may shift or channel behav-
ior under ambiguity into a speciﬁc direction. Trautmann and Van De Kuilen
(forthcoming) refer to these inﬂuences as 'moderators of ambiguity attitudes.'
One of these moderators is feedback from groups. Keck et al. (2011) ﬁnd that
decisions in (small) groups of three have a weak tendency toward ambiguity neu-
trality compared to individual decisions. Charness et al. (2013) study persuasion
in mixed groups, which include all types of ambiguity attitudes. Interestingly,
they ﬁnd that ambiguity-neutral subjects are better able to persuade ambiguity-
seeking subjects and also ambiguity-averse subjects. By contrast, neither of the
latter two attitudes seems to be more justiﬁable than the other. Charness et al.
(2013) therefore conclude that ambiguity neutrality has a 'persuasive edge' over
both ambiguity aversion and ambiguity seekingness.
Combining the insight that a large proportion of traders of ambiguous assets
are inconsistent in their behavior and that ambiguity neutrality is the most per-
suasive attitude, we propose that the level of immediate market feedback can
be an important moderator of traders' ambiguity attitudes. In an extension of
Charness et al. (2013), we argue that the market feedback of ambiguity neutral
traders, via prices as well as the order book, have a persuasive inﬂuence on other
market participants, particularly if the non-neutral attitudes of the latter are
unstable. In support of this notion, Banerjee and Kremer (2010) and Baner-
jee (2011) show theoretically and empirically that market participants with a
divergence of opinion on the interpretation of public information use market
prices to update their beliefs. In a related study, Hommes (2011) ﬁnds exper-
imentally that participants are able to coordinate their individual forecasts of
market prices in the absence of any communication between subjects other than
through the observed realized price, and without any knowledge of the predictions
of other participants (p.10).
To test the premise that market feedback acts as a moderator of ambiguity
attitudes, we administer two diﬀerent market institutions, which diﬀer substan-
tially in their level of feedback. On one hand we consider the continuous open-
book double auction (DA) which provides intra-period information explicitly on
prices, bids and asks, and implicitly on volume, volatility, and liquidity. On the
other hand we consider the call market (CA) which by contrast provides only
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inter-period information on the clearing price. Accordingly, we expect the am-
biguity eﬀects to be stronger in CM than in DA. Hence, we state our hypothesis
1b.
Hypothesis 1. (b) In call markets ambiguity premiums are higher
than in double auctions.
The second explanation builds on the fact that ambiguity aversion, as a popu-
lation average, is often not very strong. Given the substantial heterogeneity of
ambiguity attitudes it comes as no surprise that average ambiguity premiums
vary greatly across diﬀerent individual decision-making tasks, often being close
to zero.12 As shown above, many distributions of ambiguity attitudes are only
modestly biased in the direction of ambiguity aversion. It is prudent to assume
that this also applies to markets.13 However, as Miller (1977) pointed out, and
in line with the divergence of opinion literature, investment decisions reﬂect the
opinion of the optimistic traders and not the average evaluation of the popula-
tion.14 Hence, if the distribution of ambiguity attitudes is very heterogeneous
and only slightly biased toward ambiguity aversion, it is possible that the more
optimistic subjects (ambiguity seekers) will determine the price.15 We therefore
argue that even if ambiguity aversion is, on average, reﬂected in the evaluation
of assets in individual decision-making situations, ambiguity premiums can only
survive in markets if the distribution of ambiguity attitudes is suﬃciently biased
toward ambiguity aversion.
This has two important implications for the design of our experimental mar-
ket. First, we choose a setup that attempts to maximize ambiguity aversion.
Subjects are able to simultaneously trade a risky and an ambiguous asset in
two separated markets on a split screen. By displaying both markets on the
same screen, we increase the comparability and salience of ambiguity, which has
been shown to pronounce ambiguity aversion (Fox and Tversky, 1995; Chow
and Sarin, 2001; Fox and Weber, 2002; Qiu and Weitzel, 2011). Moreover, by
separating the two markets with a dedicated trading account for each market,
we eliminate the possibility for arbitrage between risk and ambiguity.16 We
use simple 2-color Ellsberg urns, as 3-color Ellsberg urns seem to lead to lower
levels of ambiguity aversion (Trautmann and Van De Kuilen, forthcoming). We
12See table 1 in Trautmann and Van De Kuilen (forthcoming).
13Corgnet et al. (2013) estimate that the eﬀect of ambiguity on trading behavior is likely
to be limited if less than 1/3 of the population is ambiguity averse. Based on their model
they show that a proportion of 32% ambiguity-averse traders (with 33% noise traders instead
of ambiguity-seeking traders, and 35% ambiguity-neutral traders) translates into an average
ambiguity premium of at most 6%.
14See Banerjee (2011) for a survey and the main eﬀects of opinion divergence in markets.
15Anderson et al. (2005) and Banerjee (2011), amongst others, provide empirical evidence
that heterogeneous beliefs indeed matter for asset pricing.
16The elimination of arbitrage does not only increase the chances for ambiguity aversion,
but is also needed to exclude condition (iii) of the EMH.
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produce the ambiguous asset with 'strong ambiguity' without the explicit spec-
iﬁcation of second-order probabilities.17 This stands in contrast to studies that
use a compound lottery for the ambiguous asset, which is often referred to as
'weak ambiguity' as the second-order probabilities are known (Camerer and
Kunreuther, 1989; Sarin and Weber, 1993). Second, we introduce a treatment
eﬀect that has been reported to increase the magnitude of ambiguity aversion.
Abdellaoui et al. (2011) show that ambiguity aversion is signiﬁcantly higher for
high probability events than for medium or low probability events. We repli-
cated the urn design of Abdellaoui et al.(2011) and administered an objective
winning probability of 50%, which is used in most experiments with ambiguity,
and of 75%, in which subjects exhibit stronger preferences for risk and against
ambiguity. If we should ﬁnd ambiguity aversion in markets with a high winning
probability, but not with a medium winning probability, we can infer support
for the notion that a suﬃciently high bias toward ambiguity aversion is needed
in a distribution of heterogeneous ambiguity attitudes for ambiguity premiums
to survive in markets. We therefore, in more general terms, state our hypothesis
1c.
Hypothesis 1. (c) For a high winning probability, ambiguity premi-
ums are higher than for a medium winning probability.
We further predict that ambiguity leads to lower trading volume and increased
volatility (Dow and da Costa Werlang, 1992; Epstein and Wang, 1994; Mukerji
and Tallon, 2001; Routledge and Zin, 2009; Guidolin and Rinaldi, 2010; Illed-
itsch, 2011), and that the dispersion of ﬁnal asset holdings will be larger under
ambiguity as traders may overweight their portfolio with less ambiguous assets,
as implied by models on the home bias and the familiarity bias (Uppal and
Wang, 2003; Huang, 2007; Cao et al., 2011). Hence, analogue to hypothesis 1
we state hypotheses 2, 3, and 4 to complete the predictions on ambiguity eﬀects.
Hypothesis 2. (a) Ambiguity decreases trading volume. (b) Ambi-
guity decreases trading volume in call markets more than in double
auction markets. (c) Ambiguity decreases trading volume in mar-
kets with a high winning probability more than in markets with a
medium winning probability.
Hypothesis 3. (a) Ambiguity increases price volatility. (b) Ambigu-
ity increases price volatility in markets with a high winning proba-
17In a robustness check we degenerate the market setting into an individual auction against
the computer by implementing a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism (Becker et al., 1964).
We ﬁnd signiﬁcant ambiguity eﬀects in this individual decision-making condition which shows
that our operationalization of ambiguity is reliable.
11
bility more than in markets with a medium winning probability.18
Hypothesis 4. (a) Ambiguity increases the dispersion in ﬁnal as-
set holdings. (b) Ambiguity increases the dispersion in ﬁnal asset
holdings in call markets more than in double auction markets. (c)
Ambiguity increases the dispersion in ﬁnal asset holdings in mar-
kets with a high winning probability more than in markets with a
medium winning probability.
Note that in all hypotheses part (a) is in line with Corgnet et al. (2013) reﬂecting
a general result from the theoretical literature. We extend their hypothesis with
respect to our conditions in part (b) and (c).
3 Experimental Design
We run a 2×2×2 design with two market institutions (double auction referred
to as DA and call market referred to as CM), two objective winning probabilities
(4/8 referred to as 48 condition and 6/8 referred to as 68 condition), and two asset
types (risky asset R and ambiguous asset A). As our outcome variables refer to
the diﬀerence between the risky and ambiguous assets (ambiguity eﬀect), the
setup boils down to a classic 2× 2 design with two market institutions and two
winning probabilities. Table 2 provides an overview of the four experimental
conditions as a comparison to table 1.
Subjects traded risky assets and ambiguous assets, both of which we referred
to as shares. The shares were simultaneously traded on a split screen with
the risky market on the left-hand side (with light-blue background) and the
ambiguous market on the right-hand side (with light-yellow background), or vice
versa.19 The two markets on the split screen were administered separately, each
with a separate account. Thus, arbitrage across markets was not possible. The
treatments directly contrasted the risky with the ambiguous asset, which makes
the ambiguous alternative more salient and pronounces ambiguity eﬀects (Fox
and Tversky, 1995). To avoid any reference to risk or ambiguity we referred
to the shares on the two sides of the split screen as blue and yellow shares,
respectively. At the beginning of each trading period, subjects were endowed
with one of two endowment proﬁles. Four traders received ten blue shares and
4,200 ECU cash in the blue market and six yellow shares and 5,200 ECU cash
in the yellow market. The other four traders received six blue shares and 5,200
18Note that CM treatments do not provide continuous trading data for intra-period volatil-
ity.
19We counter-balanced R and A on the left- and right-hand side of the split screen: four
traders (randomly determined) always traded the risky asset on the left-hand side and the
ambiguous asset on the right-hand side of the split screen, and the other four traders vice
versa.
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ECU cash in the blue market and ten yellow shares and 4,200 ECU cash in the
yellow market. In all endowments, 3,000 ECU of the cash portion was provided
as a loan and had to be returned at the end of each period.20 Thus, eight
subjects belonged to one market cohort and the composition did not change
throughout the entire experiment. Short sales were not allowed. Instructions
along with all data at period level, screenshots and the laboratory set up can
be found in the online supplements C, D and E.
For each of the four conditions (CM48, CM68, DA48, DA68) we ran two ses-
sions. Each experimental session consisted of 24 market participants organized
into three cohorts and 12 consecutive and identically designed periods. Thus,
our analysis is based on 24 cohorts with a total of 192 subjects. Our source of
ambiguity is a non-computerized version of Abdellaoui et al. (2011, section III).
All monetary values were denominated in experimental currency units (ECU)
with an exchange rate of 200 ECU per Euro.
3.1 Market Institutions
In the DA conditions eight participants had the opportunity to buy and sell
shares from each of the two markets in two standard computerized continuous
open-book double auction markets. Each period lasted four minutes. The screen
was organized in such a way that it simultaneously displayed the two indepen-
dent double auction markets on the left- and right-hand side in the colors of the
respective share.
In the CM conditions we replaced the double auction with a call market,
keeping everything else equal. In each of the two markets, traders submitted a
buy order by entering the maximum quantity of shares they were willing to buy
and the highest price they were willing to pay. Furthermore, they submitted a
sell order by entering the maximum quantity of shares they were willing to sell
and the lowest price they were willing to accept. Then the computer matched
the buy and sell orders to determine a market price for each of the two shares
and then cleared each of the two markets separately. We used the programming
code and implementation of Cheung and Palan (2012).21
3.2 Risky Shares and Ambiguous Shares
We followed the experimental design of Abdellaoui et al. (2011) and imple-
mented a non-computerized version of their ambiguous urn. At the end of each
period, each share paid either a low (124 ECU) or a high dividend (300 ECU).
These dividend payments were determined by drawing a ball from an Ellsberg
urn that contained eight balls with up to eight colors. If the drawn ball matched
20None of the subjects went bankrupt.
21We thank the authors for providing their zTree code.
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one of the X winning colors, the corresponding share earned the high dividend;
otherwise the share earned the low dividend. In condition 48 (four winning
colors out of eight possible colors) the probability of drawing a winning color
was 50%. In condition 68 (six winning colors out of eight possible colors) we
increased the objective winning probability to 75%.22
The X winning colors were determined as follows. Upon arrival, and without
any information about the experiment, each of the 24 subjects selected X colors
by independently and privately marking them on a sheet with the eight possible
colors. Hence, each of the 24 sheets indicated X privately chosen winning colors.
The 24 sheets were pinned on the lab wall, organized in two columns such that
each subject was able to see it. One column with 12 sheets represented the
winning colors of the risky (= blue) shares for each of the 12 periods along with
a blue colored poster named BLUE to identify the share. The other column with
12 sheets represented the winning colors of the ambiguous (= yellow) shares for
each of the 12 periods along with a yellow colored poster named YELLOW.23
For the risky share, we publicly ﬁlled one urn with exactly eight balls of
eight diﬀerent colors and placed it below the blue poster. After each period, a
randomly chosen subject drew one ball from the risky urn and we compared the
drawn color with the winning colors for that period to determine the dividend.
To operationalize ambiguity, 12 diﬀerent urns (one for each period) were created
as follows. For each session we invited four additional subjects ('ambiguity
providers'), who stayed in the waiting room outside of the lab. After the other
24 subjects were seated and marked their winning colors, we removed mobile
blinds from a table with jars of enough balls to ﬁll each urn with only one of
the eight colors.24 Then we asked the ambiguity providers to ﬁll three urns
each and concealed the table with the blinds again. Neither the experimenters
nor the other subjects were able to see how the ambiguity providers ﬁlled the
ambiguous urns (one by one) behind the blinds.25 After the ambiguity providers
handed over their ambiguous urns, we placed all 12 urns in a random sequence
directly below the yellow poster in full view of all the subjects. Below the blue
poster we placed the risky urn (after public disclosure of the contents of the risky
urn). We then privately paid the ambiguity providers a ﬁxed fee of six Euros
22Note that both urns are commonly referred to as '2-color Ellsberg urn' despite the fact
that they contain up to eight colors and diﬀerent winning probabilities. This is to diﬀerentiate
it from '3-color Ellsberg urn problems' in which risky and ambiguous assets are mixed in one
urn.
23A photo of the setup in the lab can be seen in the online supplement C.
24We provided 12x8=96 balls for each color in all other sessions, i.e., in total 768 balls.
25If the experimenter ﬁlled the urn decision makers may think that the experimenter had
chosen a probability distribution with the objective of minimizing the subjects' expected utility
(see discussion in Chow and Sarin (2002)). We avoid this situation by letting independent
subjects ﬁll the urn without any knowledge of the experiment.
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and dismissed them.26 After each period, a randomly determined subject drew
a ball from one of the 12 ambiguous urns (randomly chosen by the subject)
to determine the dividend of the ambiguous asset. The ambiguous urn was
then removed. Comprehension questions revealed that subjects understood the
dividend procedure for the risky share and for the ambiguous share precisely.27
3.3 Procedure and Payment
All subjects were recruited by using ORSEE (Greiner, 2004). Subjects were
invited from a broad student database across several ﬁelds of study. We only
invited subjects, who had never participated in asset market experiments be-
fore.28 All market sessions were run at the University of Düsseldorf (Germany).
One session constituted 24 market participants, involving three cohorts of eight
traders and four ambiguity providers. Apart from the end-of-period draw from
the urns, the experiment was entirely computerized using z-Tree (Fischbacher,
2007). Dividends were entered using an experimenter screen. One session lasted
approximately two hours. Subjects received an average payment of at least 20
Euros (see table 2).
The sequence of events was as follows. Upon arrival, market participants
marked the winning colors in private and the ambiguity providers ﬁlled the
ambiguous urns and were then dismissed. Market participants were then trained
on-screen on how to use the computer interface. We explained step-by-step
how to buy and sell assets. Then subjects took part in trial rounds to get
accustomed to the interface. After the trial rounds, we carefully explained the
actual experiment and in particular the determination of dividend payments.29
We then privately answered remaining questions and started the ﬁrst of the
12 payoﬀ-relevant periods. After period 12, we employed the random incentive
system to determine payments (Starmer and Sudgen, 1991; Hey and Lee, 2005).
One of the 12 periods was individually and randomly selected (with a 12-sided
dice). Within the payoﬀ-relevant period we selected one of the two markets of
the split screen (blue or yellow) with a coin ﬂip. Traders received the end-of-
period net cash plus the dividends of their share holdings from that market plus
26The blinds stayed around the table with the jars throughout the whole experiment so that
nobody (also not the experimenters) could see the remaining balls in the jars. To make sure
that there were eight balls in each ambiguous urn, we counted the number of balls through
the fabric of the urns (bags).
27In the 68 condition subjects had a short questionnaire to check whether they understood
the procedure, and 96% of all students answered all questions correctly. As the diﬀerence
between the 68 condition and the 48 condition is minimal, we are conﬁdent that the students
in the 48 condition understood the procedure as well.
28To minimize the confounding eﬀects and variance arising from gender compositions in
experimental assert markets as shown in Eckel and Füllbrunn (2013), we only invited male
students. Unfortunately, in CM48 two cohorts also include some female traders as not enough
males registered for the experiment. As we ﬁnd no indication for diﬀerences between pure
male market and mixed markets, we do not report them separately.
29All instructions and z-Tree codes are available from the authors upon request.
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show-up fee.30 Thereafter, they answered a short demographic questionnaire,
were privately paid in cash and dismissed.
4 Results
We search for ambiguity eﬀects by using the within period diﬀerences between
the risky (R) market and the ambiguous (A) market as the relevant unit of
observation. To test our hypotheses we consider the following measures:
1. ambiguity premium: price diﬀerence between the risky and the
ambiguous shares (AP = PR − PA),31
2. diﬀerence in trading quantity: QD = QuantityR −QuantityA,
3. diﬀerence in volatility: diﬀerence in the standard deviation of prices (in
DA only), i.e., StDevD = StDevR − StDevA, and
4. diﬀerence in dispersion (standard deviation) of ﬁnal share holdings:
DisD = DispersionR −DispersionA.
To evaluate whether markets show ambiguity eﬀects within conditions, we test
the Null that the suggested measures are equal to zero (no ambiguity eﬀect). We
provide results on four test methods. First, we run a Wilcoxon signed-rank test
on each period and each condition with six independent observations. Second,
we run a Wilcoxon signed-rank test on the average of all 12 periods and each
condition with six independent observations. Third, we consider a Wilcoxon
signed-rank test in line with Haruvy and Noussair (2006) (henceforth HN test)
treating the period average in each condition as the relevant unit of observation
yielding 12 observations from 12 periods for each condition. Fourth, we allow
for a higher number of observations by pooling the observations in two blocks
separately. In block I we pool the ﬁrst six periods and in block II we pool the
last six periods. Thus, we have 36 observations from six cohorts in six periods
in each block.32
To compare across conditions, we use the HN test on the period diﬀerences
of average condition measures between conditions and the Mann-Whitney U
30The show-up fee was 4 Euro in the 48 condition markets and 3 Euro in the 68 condition
markets.
31In (Trautmann and Van De Kuilen, forthcoming) ambiguity premium is deﬁned as the
price diﬀerence between the risky and the ambiguous asset relative to either the risk-neutral
price or the price of the risky asset. We deﬁne the ambiguity premium as the diﬀerence
between prices to allow for a comparison across conditions as the other measures are biased
due to the diﬀerences in winning probabilities or general price level eﬀects across conditions.
For robustness we reran all tests with an ambiguity premium relative to the expected value,
but ﬁnd no qualitative diﬀerence to the reported results based on our measure.
32The third and fourth test assume that average period condition measures are independent
over periods, resulting in equal weights for all periods.
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tests within blocks. We use a 95% conﬁdence interval as a standard level of
statistical signiﬁcance (p < 0.05) unless otherwise stated. In the following we
provide tables with aggregate data. Detailed tables on period data and also
on prices can be found in the online supplement D. The tables provide further
information on test statistics and measures.
4.1 Ambiguity Premium
For each period, we computed the diﬀerence of prices between the risky share
and the ambiguous share, i.e., AP = PR−PA. In DA we consider median period
prices and in CM we consider clearing prices. To evaluate whether markets
show ambiguity eﬀects on prices, we test the Null that AP is equal to zero
for each condition separately. Table 3 reports the condition averages for each
period (n = 6) along with p-values according to the above-mentioned tests. A
positive AP indicates ambiguity aversion. The average AP over all periods is
1.84 ECU in DA48 and 2.42 ECU in DA68. However, as the test statistics in
table 3 suggest, we cannot reject the Null in either DA condition (apart from
two periods). The average AP over all periods is 3.42 ECU in CM48 and 8.54
ECU in CM68. While we cannot reject the Null in CM48 we ﬁnd ample support
for a positive AP in CM68. The average AP in each period is positive, in seven
out of 12 periods AP is signiﬁcantly positive at least at the 10% level, and for
all other tests we ﬁnd the diﬀerences to be signiﬁcant.33
To provide an intuition of whether the ambiguity premium is economically
signiﬁcant, we calculated the relative ambiguity premium using the expected
value as a reference, i.e., AP/212 in condition 48 and AP/256 in condition 68.34
The overall relative ambiguity premium is 3.32% in CM68 while the premium is
only 0.87% in DA48.35 Figure 1 depicts the average relative ambiguity premium
over time. While conditions DA48, DA68, and CM48 have values above and
below zero, in CM68 we ﬁnd that the relative ambiguity premium is positive
and relatively constant over time.
Table 4 provides the diﬀerence on the average AP for each comparison of
conditions, and the test results on the Null that diﬀerences in AP between
33Dividend payments might have an eﬀect on pricing in subsequent periods due to e.g.,
the gambler's fallacy. Using a random eﬀects regression model or an OLS model clustered on
sessions we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant eﬀects of the lagged dividends on ambiguity premium considering
all observations (263) or each condition separately (with 66 observations each). The dependent
variable was the price diﬀerence and independent variables were a dummy 0/1 for the low/high
lagged dividend payment for the risky share, a dummy 0/1 for the low/high lagged dividend
payment for the ambiguous share and the interaction of both. Results are available from
authors on request.
34In condition 48 the expected value is 124× 0.5 + 300× 0.5 = 212 and in condition 68 the
expected value is 124× 0.25 + 300× 0.75 = 256.
35Note that the relative ambiguity premium seems quite small in comparison to (Sarin and
Weber, 1993) which is above 66% in one of the double auction market treatments. This is due
to the fact that our expected value is already quite high.
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conditions are equal to zero. First we take a separate look at the eﬀect of the
market institutions for each condition 48 and 68. The average diﬀerence is 1.58
ECU in the 48 condition and 6.09 ECU in the 68 condition, which suggests
that the ambiguity premium is higher in CM than in DA. In the 48 condition,
however, we cannot support a treatment eﬀect of the market institution as none
of the tests reject the Null. In the 68 condition, however, we ﬁnd support for
a higher ambiguity premium in CM than in DA as the HN test is signiﬁcant
at the 10% level and the Mann-Whitney U test is signiﬁcant at the 1% level
in block II. However, we ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in block I. Second, we
investigate the probability eﬀect for each institution separately. The average
diﬀerence is -5.09 ECU in CM and -0.58 ECU in DA, which suggests that the
ambiguity premium is higher in the 68 condition than in the 48 condition. In
DA, we cannot support a probability eﬀect as none of the tests rejects the Null.
In CM we do ﬁnd support for a higher ambiguity premium in the 68 condition
compared to the 48 condition as the block I test is signiﬁcant at the 10% level
and the block II test is signiﬁcant at the 1% level. However, using the HN test
we do not ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant eﬀect.36
Summing up, we can state the following result 1 for the ambiguity eﬀect on
the ambiguity premium.
Result 1. (a) We ﬁnd a signiﬁcant ambiguity premium, but only in
the call market with a high winning probability. (b) We ﬁnd weak
support for a higher ambiguity premium in the call market than in
the double auction market, but in the high probability condition
only. (c) We ﬁnd weak support for a higher ambiguity premium in
the high probability condition, but in call markets only.
4.2 Volume and Volatility
For each period, we computed the diﬀerence between the number of trades of
the risky share and of the ambiguous share, i.e., QD = QuantityR−QuantityA.
Table 5 reports condition averages of QD for each period along with p-values
from the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. A positive (negative) QD indicates that
more risky (ambiguous) shares have changed hand. For CM48, DA48, and DA68
we ﬁnd no indication of an ambiguity eﬀect on volume. However, in CM68 we
ﬁnd signiﬁcant diﬀerences in each test though not in each period, which shows
that the number of executed trades is signiﬁcantly higher for the ambiguous
36As a robustness check, we run the same tests with the relative ambiguity premium. The
results are qualitatively in line with table 4. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant diﬀerences in DA. We ﬁnd
signiﬁcant diﬀerences in CM in block II (p = 0.0018) and marginally signiﬁcant diﬀerences at
the 10% level in block I (p = 0.0898). Using the HN test, we ﬁnd no statistically signiﬁcant
diﬀerence.
18
share. On average (all periods) the trading volume in ambiguous markets is
28% higher than in risky markets.
Table 6 reports the diﬀerence of the average QD for each comparison of con-
ditions, and test results for the Null that diﬀerences in QD between conditions
are equal to zero. First, we take a separate look at the eﬀect of the market
institution for each condition 48 and 68. The diﬀerences of QD between condi-
tions CM and DA are both negative, indicating that QD is higher in CM than
in DA. But only in the 68 condition do we ﬁnd support for an ambiguity eﬀect
as all three tests suggest signiﬁcant diﬀerences at the 10% level. Second, we
take a separate look at the probability eﬀect for each institution. While we do
not ﬁnd a probability eﬀect in DA, it quite clearly exists in CM as the block
I test is signiﬁcant at the 10% level and the HN test and the block II test are
signiﬁcant at and below the 5% level. The results indicate that in CM the QD
is higher in the 68 condition than in the 48 condition.
As tables 5 and 6 suggest, we ﬁnd no ambiguity eﬀect on the volatility of
prices (StDevD = StDevR−StDevA) neither within (DA48, DA68) nor across
conditions (DA48 vs. DA68).37
Summarizing, we can formulate results 2 and 3 focusing on ambiguity eﬀects
on volume and volatility.
Result 2. (a) Signiﬁcantly more trades are executed in the ambigu-
ous market than in the risky market only in the call market with
high winning probability. (b) We ﬁnd support that the diﬀerence in
executed trades is higher in the call market than in the double auc-
tion market, but in the high probability condition only. (c) We ﬁnd
support that the diﬀerence in executed trades is higher in the high
probability condition than in the medium probability condition, but
in call markets only.
Result 3. We ﬁnd no support of an ambiguity eﬀect on volatility (a)
within or (b) between conditions.
4.3 Share Holdings
For each period, we computed the diﬀerence of the standard deviation of end-
of-period-share holdings (henceforth dispersion) between the risky share and
the ambiguous share, i.e., DisD = DispersionR − DispersionA. Table 7 re-
ports the condition averages of DisD for each period along with p-values from
the Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. A positive (negative) DisD indicates that the
37For robustness, we run the same tests with the ratio of standard deviations, i.e, with
(StDevR/StDevA). None of the tests (Block I, Block II, HN) is statistically diﬀerent at the
5% level, in line with the results on StDevD .
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distribution of the end of period shareholdings is more dispersed for the risky
share than for the ambiguous share. In CM68 we ﬁnd a signiﬁcant ambiguity
eﬀect in all tests (though not for each individual period), which shows that the
distribution of shares is more dispersed in the ambiguous market than in the
risky market.
A comparison between the conditions yields some support for the ambiguity
eﬀect on dispersion to be lower in DA than in CM and to be lower in the 48
than in 68 condition (see table 8). However, the support is weak as signiﬁcant
diﬀerences can only be found at the 10% level for the HN test and at the 5%
level for only one of the two blocks.
Summing up, we state result 4 on the eﬀect of ambiguity on the dispersion
of end-of-period-share holdings.
Result 4. (a) The dispersion of end-of-period-share holdings is higher
for the ambiguous share than for the risky share only in the call mar-
ket with a high winning probability. (b) We ﬁnd weak support that
the diﬀerence in dispersion is higher in the call market than in the
double auction market, but in the high probability condition only.
(c) We ﬁnd weak support that the diﬀerence in dispersion is higher
in the high probability condition than in the medium probability
condition, but in call markets only.
5 Discussion and Robustness
In general our results show that ambiguity eﬀects arise only when certain
conditions are met. First, we only found ambiguity eﬀects in markets without
any intra-period feedback. Second, given such markets, we found the ambiguity
eﬀects to be most pronounced when ambiguity attitudes were suﬃciently biased
toward ambiguity aversion in the high-winning probability condition.
We start the discussion with our baseline hypothesis that ambiguity premia
survive in markets (H1a). We ﬁnd ambiguity premia in the high winning prob-
ability condition in call markets, but not in any of the double auction markets.
The latter is in line with most of the previous studies which primarily employed
double auctions and also did not ﬁnd any statistically robust ambiguity premia
(Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989; Bossaerts et al., 2010; Kocher and Trautmann,
2013; Corgnet et al., 2013). Sarin and Weber (1993), however, report ambiguity
premiums in double auctions, even when they allowed for arbitrage between the
risky and the ambiguous asset. The design of their experiments 7 and 14 share
similarities to our DA48 condition, but in contrast to their study, we ﬁnd no
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ambiguity premium in DA48.38 One reason might be the diﬀerence in the imple-
mentation of the double auction market. We used a computerized anonymous
double auction design while Sarin and Weber (1993) used an open outcry double
auction. In the latter, subjects are not anonymous and are under observation
by peers. This peer-eﬀect has been frequently found to increase ambiguity aver-
sion (Curley et al., 1986; Trautmann et al., 2008; Muthukrishnan et al., 2009).
An intuitive explanation for this may be that subjects try to avoid losses more
when they are publicly observable, but it is still unclear what drives this eﬀect
(Trautmann and Van De Kuilen, forthcoming). Further, in Sarin and Weber
(1993) the shares paid either zero or 100 ECU while in our setting the shares
always paid a positive amount (as in Corgnet et al. (2013)). Reviewing the lit-
erature on ambiguity premiums Trautmann and Van De Kuilen (forthcoming)
concluded that positive (rather than zero) payoﬀs in case the bet is lost strongly
reduce the premium. Although the diﬀerences in the minimum dividend might
explain Sarin and Weber's (1993) results, Bossaerts et al. (2010) and Kocher
and Trautmann (2013) also have minimum dividends of zero, but ﬁnd no robust
evidence for ambiguity premiums. Finally, Sarin and Weber (1993) allowed for
short sales, which enable ambiguity-/risk-averse traders to price in their pes-
simistic beliefs, eﬀectively leading to lower prices (Miller, 1977). Indeed, the
only two studies that report ambiguity eﬀects also both allowed for short sales
(Sarin and Weber, 1993; Bossaerts et al., 2010). However, ﬁnal shareholdings
in Sarin and Weber (1993) suggest no eﬀects from short sales.39 It is there-
fore questionable whether short sales have driven their results (also see further
below).
Our evidence for ambiguity premia in the high winning probability condition
in call markets provides support for both hypothesis 1b and 1c, but primarily in
combination. In accordance with hypothesis 1b our results suggest that market
feedback (or rather the lack of it) is a moderator of ambiguity as the ambiguity
premium, particularly for high winning probabilities, is higher in call markets
than in double auction markets. Building on evidence from group decision
making, we argued that the 'persuasive edge' of the ambiguity neutral traders
(Charness et al., 2013) has a stronger impact in markets with feedback than
in markets without feedback. In markets with feedback the persuasive edge
of ambiguity neutrality may be strengthened by an 'intrinsic taste to confor-
mity in markets' (Goeree and Yariv, 2007), i.e., the adoption of the opinion
38Sarin and Weber (1993) provide two independent market observations in their experiments
7 and 14. Our study provides six independent market observations for DA48 (and another six
for DA68).
39Table 4 in Sarin and Weber (1993) shows that in experiment 7 and 14 (analogue to
our DA48) the number of shares shorted is the same for the risky and the ambiguous asset.
Bossaerts et al. (2010) provide no additional information on short sales.
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of other market participants on prices by neglecting own attitudes and beliefs.
This might be especially prevalent in our experimental design, where subjects
simultaneously trade in two markets with identical objective winning probabil-
ities. Our split screen design was meant to increase ambiguity aversion, in line
with prior evidence that ambiguity is less attractive when directly compared
with risk (Fox and Tversky, 1995; Chow and Sarin, 2001; Fox and Weber, 2002;
Qiu and Weitzel, 2011). This prior evidence, however, focused on one-shot in-
dividual decision making with no feedback. With continuous market feedback
on both the risky and the ambiguous asset (with the same underlying winning
probability), the split screen design may actually have the opposite eﬀect with
spillover eﬀects of more 'intrinsic conformity' across both assets. Although the
experimental evidence on spillover eﬀects on prices in multiple asset markets
is mixed (Palan, 2013), the split screen design could be a reason why we did
not ﬁnd any ambiguity premiums in markets with intra-period feedback (double
auctions). To test for this possibility, we reran DA48, but with the diﬀerence
that subjects traded either two risky shares or two ambiguous shares. Thus,
each market of eight participants only traded one type of asset, mimicking the
independent market setup of Sarin and Weber (1993) and Corgnet et al. (2013).
The results of this robustness check showed no statistically signiﬁcant diﬀerence
in prices between the separately traded risky and ambiguous assets (see the
online supplement B for detailed information on the design and the results).
We are therefore conﬁdent that the split-screen design is not the reason for the
missing ambiguity premiums in the double auction markets.
According to hypothesis 1b, market feedback within a trading period is the
crucial mechanism, which is why we expect to see ambiguity eﬀects in the CM,
but not in the DA. This neglects the possibility of market feedback and learning
across periods. Liu and Colman (2009) argue that ambiguity aversion is washed
away with repetitions. Indeed, Sarin and Weber (1993) ﬁnd weak convergence
of prices over periods in some of their independent market settings. However,
in reviewing the literature on ambiguity eﬀects, Trautmann and Van De Kuilen
(forthcoming) could not identify any consistent learning pattern, not even in
individual decision making. In line with the latter study we also do not ﬁnd
learning patterns across periods. If inter-period market feedback plays a role,
ambiguity eﬀects should be weaker in later periods, in particular in the CM,
where no other feedback is possible. Although we ﬁnd an ambiguity premium
right from the start in CM68, table 3 reports no tendency for it to disappear.
In fact, even in the last three periods in CM68, there exists a signiﬁcant ambi-
guity premium, suggesting a rather constant ambiguity eﬀect. Also, neither of
the other markets (CM48, DA48, DA68) display any consistent learning eﬀects
across periods (see table 3).
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In accordance with hypothesis 1c we ﬁnd evidence that only relatively strong
biases toward ambiguity aversion survive in markets, but also only in call mar-
kets with limited feedback. Speciﬁcally, ambiguous assets with winning prob-
abilities of 50% (or lower), as used in most previous studies (see table 1), do
not seem to provide suﬃciently strong ambiguity aversion. As Miller (1977)
pointed out, investment decisions reﬂect the opinion of the optimistic traders.
Our results support the notion that in markets with an only slightly biased pop-
ulation (DA48, CM48) there remains a suﬃcient number of optimistic subjects
to prevent ambiguity premia. This requires, however, that our operationaliza-
tion of ambiguity with the medium winning probability is suﬃcient to produce
ambiguity eﬀects even in individual decision making. If not, this could trivially
explain why we do not ﬁnd any eﬀects in DA48 or in CM48. We therefore
degenerated the two sided call market setting CM48 into an individual auction
against the computer by implementing a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak mechanism
(Becker et al., 1964). Subjects submitted their willingness-to-pay for one share
in each of the two markets in 12 subsequent periods, using a split screen parti-
tioning to stay close to the appearance of the market treatments. We refer to
the online supplement A for information on the design and the results of this
robustness check. We ﬁnd that subjects' individual willingness-to-pay for the
risky asset was signiﬁcantly greater than for the ambiguous asset. However,
although these results support our operationalization of ambiguity, alternative
methods might have been even stronger. In our study we use a novel opera-
tionalization of ambiguity where external ambiguity providers ﬁlled the urns.
The other studies mentioned in table 1 either used compound lotteries or did
not tell subjects how the ambiguous urn was produced. If compound lotteries
provided stronger ambiguity than our method, it could explain why Sarin and
Weber (1993) found ambiguity premiums while we did not. As another robust-
ness check we therefore ran the Becker-DeGroot-Marschak condition again, but
this time produced the ambiguous asset with a compound lottery. The diﬀerence
between the willingness-to-pay for the risky and the ambiguous assets turned
out to be smaller and statistically signiﬁcant only in one out of 12 periods.
Hence, we are conﬁdent that our operationalization of ambiguity in the market
experiments is suﬃciently strong (and also stronger than compound lotteries
used in Sarin and Weber (1993)).
Next to hypothesis 1 on the ambiguity premium we also found support for a
higher dispersion of share holdings under ambiguity (H4). Again, the expected
eﬀects primarily hold for CM68, which conﬁrms the importance of limited mar-
ket feedback and a suﬃcient bias toward ambiguity aversion as important an-
tecedents.
We found no support for our hypothesis 3 on price volatility. As there is
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no volatility measurement in call markets, H3 is the only hypothesis that solely
focuses on double auctions. Analogous to hypothesis 1b we barely ﬁnd any
ambiguity eﬀects in the double auction market. The lack of support for H3 is
therefore not very surprising. Moreover, it is in line with Corgnet et al. (2013),
who also analyzed (and did not ﬁnd) ambiguity eﬀects on volatility.
Finally, our results do not support hypothesis 2 on the number of executed
trades. In fact, we found statistically signiﬁcant evidence of the exact opposite,
namely that the number of executed trades increases under ambiguity. Our
hypothesis 2 is based on Corgnet et al. (2013), who predict a lower number
of trades under ambiguity. In a market consisting of noise traders, ambiguity-
neutral traders and ambiguity-averse traders, the latter have a price range (for
long and short sales) in which they do not hold any ambiguous assets. Accord-
ingly, the interaction with other traders in this speciﬁc price range is reduced,
which leads to a lower number of trades in comparison to a setting without
ambiguity-averse traders. As in our study, Corgnet et al. (2013) do not ﬁnd
support for this hypothesis. A reason for this may be that their model does not
include market participants that are ambiguity seeking. Other models allow for
ambiguity seekingness, but do not explicitly model the interplay between these
opposite trader types.40 Our ﬁnding of a positive correlation between trading
volume and ambiguity corresponds, however, with the divergence of opinions
literature. Motivated by the optimistic pricing model of Miller (1977), this lit-
erature encompasses the whole spectrum of optimistic and pessimistic beliefs.
It predicts not only a positive relation between belief dispersion and prices,
but also a positive relation between dispersion and trading volume (Ajinkya
et al., 1991). Many of these models, however, crucially rely on the presence of
short sales constraints, which prevent the full revelation of information about
pessimistic beliefs (Banerjee, 2011). Interestingly, all experiments that found in-
dications of ambiguity aversion in markets did not have short sales constraints
(Sarin and Weber, 1993; Bossaerts et al., 2010), while experiments that did not
ﬁnd any ambiguity eﬀects had constraints on short sales (Camerer and Kun-
reuther, 1989; Corgnet et al., 2013). This suggests that short sales may be an
additional condition for ambiguity eﬀects to survive in markets. Although we
did not allow for short sales in this study, we may have suﬃciently cornered
ambiguity eﬀects in a speciﬁc market environment (CM68) so that short sales
40Equilibrium in such a setting is much more complicated. For example, Bossaerts et al.
(2010) use the α-maxmin model of Ghirardato et al. (2004) which is a generalization of the
maxmin model by Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989) used in Dow and da Costa Werlang (1992);
Corgnet et al. (2013). The α-maxmin model allows for ambiguity seekingness if α < 1/2.
However, to keep their model tractable, Bossaerts et al. (2010, p.1337) develop and illustrate
their theoretical expectations with two types of agents: expected utility maximizers with a
common prior (Type I), and ambiguity-averse agents with multiple priors and an α > 1/2
(Type II).
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were not necessary. The question, to which extent short sales support ambiguity
eﬀects in markets, is an interesting avenue for further research.
6 Conclusion
The lack of robust ambiguity eﬀects in experimental asset markets suggests
that subjects are susceptible to moderators of ambiguity. Using asset mar-
ket experiments, we considered two potential moderators of ambiguity eﬀects
namely intra-period market feedback and the winning probability of the ambigu-
ous asset in a 2× 2 design. We implemented the ﬁrst moderator by comparing
a no-feedback-market, i.e., a call market, with a full-feedback-market, i.e., a
double-auction market. We introduced the second moderator by increasing the
winning probability for the ambiguous asset from 50% to 75%. Such a shift has
been shown to increase ambiguity aversion (Abdellaoui et al., 2011). In line
with recent literature, we found no evidence for ambiguity eﬀects in markets
with a medium-winning probability. The same holds true in markets providing
immediate feedback. However, we found clear ambiguity eﬀects in markets with-
out intra-period market feedback given suﬃciently averse ambiguity attitudes
toward assets with high winning probabilities.
In a recent study on ambiguity eﬀects in markets, Corgnet et al. (2013) ﬁnd
no evidence for ambiguity eﬀects and conclude that the signiﬁcance of the dis-
tinction between risk and ambiguity crucially hinges on the speciﬁc environment
under study (p.2). In this paper we were able to carve out conditions that need
to be met for ambiguity eﬀects to survive in speciﬁc market environments. A
ﬁrst essential condition is that the distribution of ambiguity attitudes should
be suﬃciently biased toward ambiguity aversion. The second condition is that
feedback of other market participants needs to be limited. More theoretical and
experimental research is needed to investigate other possible conditions and the
market mechanisms under which ambiguity eﬀects arise in markets.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Ambiguity in Asset Market Experiments
The table provides an overview of asset market experiments with ambiguity. Ambiguity refers to the
operationalization of the ambiguous urn with either a compound lottery (weak ambiguity) or with
an unknown distribution (strong ambiguity). Urn type refers either to a purely ambiguous asset
(2-color) or a mix of ambiguous and risky assets in one urn (3-color). Dividends show the low and
high dividend payments in ECU. Arbitrage refers to conditions which either allowed for arbitrage
by trading risky and ambiguous assets simultaneously or which did not allow for arbitrage as assets
were traded in independent markets. Domain refers to the gain or loss domain of the asset's lottery.
Winning probability is the objective probability of earning the high 'dividend' payment (which is
zero in Camerer and Kunreuther, 1989). Market institutions were either the double auction (DA),
the ﬁrst price sealed bid auction (FPA), or the uniform price auction (UPA). The table further
provides information on the number of independent markets (# ind. obs.), the number of traders
in a market, and the number of repetitions. In the results section the table reports statistically
signiﬁcant eﬀects on prices, price volatility, number of executed trades, and the standard deviations
of end of period stock holdings (Dispersion). For - the papers provide insuﬃcient information to
make a statement on the respective eﬀect.
Camerer/ Sarin/ Bossaerts Kocher/ Corgnet
Kunreuther Weber et al. Trautmann et al.
(1989) (1993) (2010) (2013) (2013)
Country US GER US NL US
Ambiguity weak weak strong strong strong
Urn type 2-color 2-color 3-colora 2-color 2-color
Dividends -20/-40/-100, 0 0, 100 0, 1 0, 30 100, 200b
Arbitrage yes yes/no yes no no
Domain loss gain gain gain gain
Win. Prob. 0.5-0.99 0.05/0.5 0.33c 0.50 0.50
Market DA UPA/DA DA FPA DA
# Ind. Obs. 13 6d/4e 6f 8 18g
# Traders 6-12h 8 24-29 20-24 8
# Rep. 10-35 2-16 8 1 2
Ambiguity eﬀects found on
Price No R > Ai Not robust No No
Volatility - - - - No
Volume No - - - No
Dispersion - No Yesj - No
a3-color urn with one market for each color.
bExpected dividends as dividends were drawn from either an urn containing equally likely
dividends of 50, 100, and 150 or an urn containing equally likely dividends of 100, 200, and
300.
cApplies to beginning of trading only as balls were drawn without replacement.
dIn Aachen 1 and 2 subjects traded both assets in diﬀerent periods.
eIn Aachen 3 and 4 subjects traded both assets in diﬀerent periods.
fMarkets with one risky and two ambiguous shares.
g9 ambiguous markets and 9 risky markets.
hTraders were able only to buy or only to sell.
iOnly with winning probability 0.5. No test statistics.
jBossaerts et al. (2010) primarily analyzed ambiguity eﬀects on the portfolio composition
of modal investors and less on the asset dispersion across investors.
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Table 2: Overview of the conditions and results
For each condition (CM48, CM68, DA48, DA68) the table reports the experimental setup in com-
parison to the literature mentioned in table 1. We administered strong ambiguity with an unknown
probability distribution. We did not allow for arbitrage as subjects had one separate account for
each share. Although our ambiguous urn contains a maximum of eight colors it is not a mix of
ambiguous and risky assets (3-color Ellsberg problem), but resembles a purely ambiguous asset
(commonly referred to as '2-color' Ellsberg problem). Winning probability is the objective prob-
ability of earning the higher of the two dividends in the gain domain. Market institutions were
either the double auction (DA) or the call market (CM). The table further provides information
on the number of independent markets (# ind. obs.), the number of traders in a market, and the
number of repetitions. In the results section the table reports statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on
prices, price volatility, number of executed trades, and the standard deviations of end of period
stock holdings (Dispersion). For - the papers provide insuﬃcient information to make a statement
on the respective eﬀect.
Condition CM48 CM68 DA48 DA68
Country Germany
Ambiguity strong
Urn type 2-color
Dividends 124, 300
Arbitrage No
Domain gain
Win. Prob. 0.50 0.75 0.50 0.75
Market Call Market Double Auction
# Ind. Obs. 6 6 6 6
# Traders 8 8 8 8
# Rep. 12 12 12 12
Statistically signiﬁcant eﬀects on...
Price No R > A No No
Volatility - - No No
Volume No R < A No No
Dispersion No R < A No No
ø Pay (Euros) 20.60 22.10 21.43 22.06
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Table 3: Within condition eﬀects: Ambiguity Premium
For each condition (CM48, CM68, DA48, DA68) the table reports the average of the diﬀerence of
prices between the risky share and the ambiguous share, i.e., AP = PR−PA (six observations
for each condition). For the DA we consider the median prices and for the CM we consider the
clearing prices. For each condition we provide p-values of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. The asterisks
indicate p-values referring to a Wilcoxon signed-rank test of the Null that the diﬀerences in a
certain period are equal to zero (* p<0.10, **p<0.05). The p-values in the row 'p-value HN' refer
to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests in line with Haruvy and Noussair (2006) of the Null that all condition
averages of the 12 periods are equal to zero. The p-values in the row 'p-value block' refer to Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests of the Null that all diﬀerences of the six cohorts in the ﬁrst six periods (Block
I) and in the last six periods (Block II) are equal to zero (36 observations for each condition and
block). Data for each period can be found in the online supplement.
Period CM48 CM68 DA48 DA68
1 61.83 19.17* 20.50 -8.50
2 -19.00* 9.33 5.50 -11.92
3 2.67 2.33 9.00** 2.25
4 -23.33 9.20* -0.58 12.08
5 14.33 8.83* -5.33 5.67
6 -9.83 6.00 5.83 7.33
7 -5.00 10.67* -2.25 10.83
8 10.83 7.67 -1.00 -0.92
9 -3.83 4.50 1.33 2.17
10 4.50 6.67** 5.25 2.67
11 5.33 6.83* -7.75 7.75**
12 2.50 10.83** -8.42 -0.42
Average 3.42 8.50** 1.84 2.42
p-value HN 0.814 0.002 0.583 0.209
p-value block I 0.931 0.001 0.092 0.208
p-value block II 0.573 <0.001 0.597 0.114
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Table 4: Across condition eﬀects: Ambiguity Premium
The table reports the diﬀerences of the average condition AP (n = 12 × 6) between conditions.
For example -5.09 is the diﬀerence between AP in CM48 (3.42) and in CM68 (8.50) from table 3.
The p-values in the row 'p-value HN' refer to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests in line with Haruvy and
Noussair (2006) of the Null that the period averages of conditions do not diﬀer (12 observations).
For example, for the ﬁrst p-value 0.182 we compared row CM48 to row CM68 in table 3. The
p-values in the row 'p-value block' refer to the Mann-Whitney U tests of the Null that the rank sum
of 36 diﬀerences are equal across conditions separately for block I and block II.
48 68 CM DA
Hypothesis CM-DA=0 CM-DA=0 48-68=0 48-68=0
Diﬀerence of Averages 1.58 6.09 -5.09 -0.58
p-value HN 1.000 0.060 0.182 0.583
p-value block I 0.397 0.224 0.062 0.991
p-value block II 0.567 0.004 0.001 0.135
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Table 5: Within condition eﬀects: Volume and Volatility
For each condition (CM48, CM68, DA48, DA68) the table reports the average of the period
diﬀerences between the number of trades in the risky market and in the ambiguous market, i.e.,
QD = QuantityR−QuantityA (six observations for each condition). For conditions DA48 and
DA68 the table reports the average of the period diﬀerences between the standard deviation
of prices in the risky market and in the ambiguous market, i.e., StDevD = StDevR−StDevA
(six observations for each condition). For each condition we provide p-values of Wilcoxon
signed-rank tests. The asterisks indicate p-values referring to a Wilcoxon signed-rank test of
the Null that the diﬀerences in a certain period are equal to zero (* p<0.10, **p<0.05). The
p-values in the row 'p-value HN' refer to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests in line with Haruvy and
Noussair (2006) of the Null that all condition averages of the 12 periods are equal to zero.
The p-values in the row 'p-value block' refer to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of the Null that
all diﬀerences of the six cohorts in the ﬁrst six periods (Block I) and in the last six periods
(Block II) are equal to zero (36 observations for each condition and block). Data for each
period can be found in the online supplement.
Number of Trades Volatility
Period CM48 CM68 DA48 DA68 DA48 DA68
1 2.50 -3.00 -1.00 3.17 14.19 -20.51
2 -1.67 1.17 2.00 4.33 27.88 27.04**
3 1.00 -8.33* 2.33 4.17 24.59** 29.40
4 -3.17 -3.33 2.17 -7.83** -26.56 -11.21
5 0.67 -1.83 3.83 -6.50 1.50 22.19
6 -2.00 -7.00 -7.50** -0.50 -55.92 -42.12*
7 -0.50 -0.17 0.33 6.17 26.36 29.48
8 2.17 -6.50 -1.17 1.33 75.16 9.50**
9 -0.83 -4.67 -4.50 -3.17 -0.99 10.20
10 -1.00 1.17 -5.50** -9.00 36.75 -28.72**
11 2.50 -4.17* 4.33 1.50 -0.92 12.59
12 -1.67 -9.00* 4.33 4.33 -27.21 -12.48
Average -0.17 -3.81* -0.03 -0.17 7.90 2.11
p-value HN 0.844 0.008 0.937 0.969 0.433 0.695
p-value block I 0.771 0.022 0.712 0.950 0.300 0.838
p-value block II 1.000 0.005 0.626 0.894 0.753 0.136
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Table 6: Across condition eﬀects: Volume and Volatility
The table reports the diﬀerences of the average condition QD (n = 12 × 6) between conditions.
For example 3.64 is the diﬀerence between QD in CM48 (-0.17) and in CM68 (-3.81) from table 5.
The p-values in the row 'p-value HN' refer to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests in line with Haruvy and
Noussair (2006) of the Null that the period averages of conditions do not diﬀer (12 observations).
For example, for the ﬁrst p-value 0.182 we compared row CM48 to row CM68 in table 3. The
p-values in the row 'p-value block' refer to the Mann-Whitney U tests of the Null that the rank sum
of 36 diﬀerences are equal across conditions separately for block I and block II.
Volume Volatility
48 68 CM DA DA
Hypothesis CM-DA=0 CM-DA=0 48-68=0 48-68=0 48-68=0
Diﬀerence of Averages -0.14 -3.64 3.64 0.14 5.79
p-value HN 1.000 0.084 0.023 0.844 0.695
p-value block I 0.870 0.094 0.093 0.937 0.753
p-value block II 0.584 0.094 0.008 0.866 0.184
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Table 7: Within condition eﬀects: Dispersion of share holdings
For each condition (CM48, CM68, DA48, DA68) the table reports the average of the period
diﬀerences between the standard deviation of end of period stock holdings in the risky market
and in the ambiguous market, i.e., DisD = DispersionR − DispersionA (six observations
for each condition). For each condition we provide p-values of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests.
The asterisks indicate p-values referring to a Wilcoxon signed-rank test of the Null that the
diﬀerences in a certain period are equal to zero (* p<0.10, **p<0.05). The p-values in the
row 'p-value HN' refer to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests in line with Haruvy and Noussair (2006)
of the Null that all condition averages of the 12 periods are equal to zero. The p-values in the
row 'p-value block' refer to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of the Null that all diﬀerences of the
six cohorts in the ﬁrst six periods (Block I) and in the last six periods (Block II) are equal to
zero (36 observations for each condition and block). Data for each period can be found in the
online supplement.
Period CM48 CM68 DA48 DA68
1 0.28 -0.72 -0.20 0.89**
2 -1.43 0.55 0.21 -0.57*
3 0.02 -2.00 -0.40 1.07
4 -0.94 -1.51 -0.52 -0.04
5 0.67 -0.09 1.37* 0.62
6 -0.51 -1.43 0.62 0.22
7 -0.62 0.07 -0.51 1.42*
8 0.23 -1.63 -0.34 -0.68
9 -1.02 -1.43** 0.02 -2.16**
10 0.12 -0.85 -0.35 -1.86**
11 0.52 -0.52 0.16 -0.54
12 -0.59 -1.93** -0.10 -0.31
Average -0.27 -0.96** 0.00 -0.16
p-value HN 0.272 0.008 0.583 0.754
p-value block I 0.338 0.081 0.566 0.144
p-value block II 0.489 0.001 0.753 0.046
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Table 8: Across condition eﬀects: Dispersion of share holdings
The table reports the diﬀerences of the average condition DisD (n = 12× 6) between condi-
tions. For example 0.69 is the diﬀerence between DisD in CM48 (-0.27) and in CM68 (-0.96)
from table 7. The p-values in the row 'p-value HN' refer to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests in line
with Haruvy and Noussair (2006) of the Null that the period averages of conditions do not
diﬀer (12 observations). For example, for the ﬁrst p-value 0.182 we compared row CM48 to
row CM68 in table 3. The p-values in the row 'p-value block' refer to Mann-Whitney U tests
of the Null that the rank sum of 36 diﬀerences are equal across conditions separately for block
I and block II.
48 68 CM DA
Hypothesis CM-DA=0 CM-DA=0 48-68=0 48-68=0
Diﬀerence of Averages -0.27 -0.80 0.69 0.16
p-value HN 0.272 0.060 0.050 0.583
p-value block I 0.300 0.029 0.386 0.581
p-value block II 0.893 0.362 0.022 0.188
Figure 1: Relative Ambiguity Premium
The ﬁgures depict the average relative ambiguity premium for the conditions DA48 and DA68
on the left-hand side and for the conditions CM48 and CM68 on the right-hand side. Each
point represents the average of six observations from one period in a condition. The relative
ambiguity premium is computed as the diﬀerence between risky and ambiguous prices (PR −
PA) divided by the ambiguity neutral value which is 212 in the 48 condition and 256 in the
68 condition.
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Online Supplement
A Robustness Check: Individual Decision Mak-
ing
Given that we hardly ﬁnd any ambiguity eﬀects in 48 urn markets, it is impor-
tant to test whether our operationalization of ambiguity is suﬃcient. Therefore,
we elicited the individual willingness-to-pay (WTP) of subjects for the risky and
the ambiguous share (48 urns) using a Becker-DeGroot-Marschak Mechanism
(BDM). We again used the split-screen setup to stay close to the appearance
of the other treatments (see Figure 2). We implemented the BDM mechanism
as follows. Subjects submitted their WTP for one share in each of the two
markets. The computer drew a random price for each market. If the subject's
stated WTP exceeded the random price, the subject purchased the share at
the random price. Otherwise, the subject did not purchase the share. As the
WTP only applied to one share, we had to adjust the dividend by a factor of
10 (low/high dividend: 1,240/3,000 ECU) and the endowment to 3,500 ECU
(including a 500 ECU loan). We operationalized ambiguity as in all DA and
CM sessions by inviting ambiguity providers and letting subject choose their
WTP in 12 subsequent repetitions.
We ran session BDM1 at the University of Düsseldorf with 20 participants
who received an average payment of 16.55 Euro. We computed the individual
bid diﬀerentials between share R and A. Table 9 reports the average per pe-
riod across all subjects. As expected, the average bids for A are lower in all
periods and in the majority of periods this diﬀerence is also statistically sig-
niﬁcant. Moreover, the average diﬀerences across all periods and markets in
Session BDM1 is also statistically signiﬁcant. Applying the same test using all
period diﬀerences from each subject in the ﬁrst six periods (block I) and the
last six periods (block II), we ﬁnd diﬀerences to be highly signiﬁcant indicating
ambiguity aversion. The average relative ambiguity premium over all periods in
BDM is 7.2%. Although these results show that our operationalization works
in individual decision making, it could still be possible that alternative opera-
tionalizations of ambiguity used in related studies are even stronger. The latter
could explain why, for example, Sarin and Weber (1993) ﬁnd ambiguity eﬀects
in markets while we do not.
To test this, we implemented a compound lottery in line with Sarin and
Weber (1993) in a BDM2 session conducted at the NSM Decision Lab of Rad-
boud University Nijmegen with 12 participants who receive an average payment
of 16.58 Euro. We used the exact same source as we used in section III of
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Abdellaoui et al. (2011). This is basically the same procedure as in our other
experiments except the fact that it is the computer which creates the ambigu-
ous urn randomly instead of an ambiguity provider. Apart from the source of
ambiguity, the experimental design is the same as in BDM1. Table 9 reports
the average bid diﬀerentials between R and A for all subjects. Although the
average bids for A are lower in most of the periods (with the exception of Period
12), only one of them is statistically signiﬁcant. However, applying the same
test and using all period diﬀerences from each subject in the ﬁrst six periods
(block I) and the last six periods (block II), we ﬁnd the diﬀerences to be signiﬁ-
cant which indicates ambiguity aversion as well. The average relative ambiguity
premium over all periods in BDM2 is 4.8% which is somewhat lower than in
BDM1. Hence, overall, our primary operationalization of ambiguity by using
additional subjects is not only suﬃcient to generate ambiguity eﬀects in indi-
vidual decision making, but seems to be stronger than alternative methods with
compound lotteries used in related studies.
Figure 2: Screenshot of BDM split screen
Maximum bid for yellow/blue share 
Available amount of Taler for yellow/blue share 
Yellow/Blue Share 
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Table 9: Diﬀerences between R and A: bids in BDM
The table reports the average of diﬀerences between bids (willingness-to-pay) for the risky share
and for the ambiguous share for BDM1, our primary operationalization of ambiguity, and for BDM
2 with ambiguity as a compound lottery (with known second-order probability). For each condition
we provide p-values of Wilcoxon signed-rank tests. The asterisks indicate p-values referring to a
Wilcoxon signed-rank test of the Null that the diﬀerences in a certain period are equal to zero (*
p<0.10, **p<0.05). The p-values in the row 'p-value HN' refer to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests in line
with Haruvy and Noussair (2006) of the Null that all condition averages of the 12 periods are equal
to zero. The p-values in the row 'p-value block' refer to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests of the Null that
all diﬀerences of the six cohorts in the ﬁrst six periods (block I) and in the last six periods (block
II) are equal to zero (36 observations for each condition and block).
Period BDM1 BDM2
1 97 114
2 16 115
3 176** 10
4 282 1
5 265*** 117
6 174* 83
7 242*** 107
8 11 142
9 164*** 202**
10 31 152
11 171*** 156
12 29* -14
Average 138** 99*
p-value HN 0.002 0.005
p-value block I <0.001 <0.001
p-value block II 0.024 0.002
B Robustness Check: DA with only risky or only
ambiguous shares
In these sessions subjects traded either two risky shares (DA48R) or two am-
biguous shares (DA48A). In each treatment we named one share the blue share
and the other share the yellow share. The experimental design follows DA48
exactly, apart from the fact that in DA48R we made a random draw from the
same urn with eight marbles and eight diﬀerent colors and that in DA48A we
had six ambiguity providers who provided 24 ambiguous urns. We applied the
same procedure as in section 3.3. We conducted one DA48R session with three
separated cohorts of eight traders who received on average 21.58 Euro and one
DA48A session with three separated cohorts of 8 traders who received on aver-
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age 19.42 Euro (both at the University of Düsseldorf). Table 10 reports median
prices along with p-values from two-sided Mann-Whitney U tests comparing
prices between treatments and the HN test (see 4 for a description). To in-
crease the number of observations in the tests, we pooled period prices in block
I (periods 1 to 6) and block II (periods 7 to 12). The results show no indication
for an ambiguity premium, i.e., that prices for the risky share exceeds prices
for the ambiguous share. This result is line with Corgnet et al. (2013) who also
considered independent markets and ﬁnd no ambiguity aversion eﬀect on prices.
Table 10: Ambiguity premium in DA48R and DA48A
The table reports median period prices and the 12 period average for the risky share in DA48R and
for the ambiguous share in DA48A, separated by the color of the share (blue or yellow). The p-
values in the row 'p-value HN' refer to Wilcoxon signed-rank tests in line with Haruvy and Noussair
(2006) of the Null that the diﬀerences of price averages of the 12 periods are equal to zero. The
p-values in the row 'p-value block' refer to Mann-Whitney U tests of the Null that median prices
in the ﬁrst six periods (block I) and in the last six periods (block II) are equal to zero. Separating
the tests by shares, we have 18 observations in each block. Also pooling also the shares, we have 36
observations in each block.
Blue Share Yellow Share
Session Risk Ambiguous Risk Ambiguous
Cohort 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3 1 2 3
1 200 120 285 297 210 210 260 130 270 274 175 250
2 205 100 245 244 215 225 200 109 240 214 210 220
3 208 150 240 211 210 210 225 120 240 214 209 200
4 200 138 235 250 205 180 220 140 235 250 210 160
5 200 150 205 245 210 200 210 175 210 220 200 199
6 220 180 230 180 209 180 220 180 202 180 208 181
7 210 180 225 230 205 215 210 175 225 230 205 200
8 220 170 235 220 210 220 215 170 230 245 210 191
9 220 151 235 178 218 195 215 176 235 240 210 199
10 225 190 235 235 215 200 210 188 225 222 210 195
11 215 189 235 220 210 215 220 180 234 222 210 210
12 220 185 235 190 210 215 221 180 235 229 210 215
Average 212 159 237 225 211 205 219 160 232 228 206 202
Tests separated by share color
Diﬀ. of averages -11 -8
p-value HN 0.079 0.018
p-value block I 0.124 0.924
p-value block II 0.494 0.811
Tests both shares pooled
Diﬀ. of averages -10
p-value HN 0.029
p-value block I 0.295
p-value block II 0.817
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C Screen shots
Figure 3: Screenshot of the split screen in the DA treatment
 
Click to buy blue/yellow share at lowest ask. 
Click to sell blue/yellow share at highest bid. 
Quotes to sell 
Quotes to buy 
Time left 
Enter Ask Price, click to submit Enter Bid Price, click to submit Shares and available cash in account in markets 
Figure 4: Screenshot of the split screen in the CM treatment
 
# of blue shares to buy 
Highest price to buy  
Shares and available cash in account in markets 
# of yellow shares to sell 
Lowest price to sell  
to buy 
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Figure 5: Setup in the Lab
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D Tables on period data
Table 11: Periodical Data on Ambiguity Premium
For each condition (CM48, CM68, DA48, DA68) the table reports the price diﬀerences between the
risky asset and the ambiguous asset. For the DA treatment we consider the median prices and for
the CM treatment we consider the clearing prices.
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
CM48/1 -89 -5 -20 5 7 -10 -2 0 7 -7 0 0
CM48/2 60 -60 -16 -40 -25 -45 -25 0 -10 1 1 0
CM48/3 100 -49 12 0 9 1 7 0 0 3 1 0
CM48/4 0 0 0 -15 -5 0 0 0 0 0 15 35
CM48/5 240 0 20 -100 70 -50 0 -5 -20 10 -15 0
CM48/6 60 0 20 10 30 45 -10 70 0 20 30 -20
CM68/1 0 50 20 . 20 0 10 15 10 8 -6 0
CM68/2 0 12 5 5 0 5 10 5 5 5 8 6
CM68/3 30 10 -10 30 20 30 30 20 15 15 15 15
CM68/4 15 19 19 0 0 -20 0 4 0 5 1 19
CM68/5 10 15 5 6 3 11 0 -13 7 10 14 5
CM68/6 60 -50 -25 5 10 10 14 15 -10 -3 9 20
DA48/1 49 -2.5 10 20 -19.5 -5 -10 -15.5 0 5 -22 0
DA48/2 -15 -7.5 17 -25.5 -10 1 -9 0 1 26 2 -10
DA48/3 0 5 5 -0.5 0 9 -4.5 -2 -5 -5 -9 0
DA48/4 59.5 17 12 -5 -16 13 0 1.5 2 0 -17.5 -44.5
DA48/5 29.5 30 10 10 15 15 10 10 9 5.5 0 0
DA48/6 0 -9 0 -2.5 -1.5 2 0 0 1 0 0 4
DA68/1 40 1 44 20 20 5 15 5.5 10 16 17 4.5
DA68/2 -100 -90 -30 -2.5 10 30 53.5 5 -3 0 20 -1
DA68/3 -10 -5 -10 20 10 1.5 0 -4 1 0 2 -1
DA68/4 9 0 4.5 -15 10 -2.5 -2.5 -7.5 5 10 5 -5
DA68/5 35 35 5 40 -30 10 0 -4.5 0 -10 2.5 0
DA68/6 -25 -12.5 0 10 14 0 -1 0 0 0 0 0
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Table 12: Periodical prices of the risky share
For each condition (CM48, CM68, DA48, DA68) the table reports the periodical prices for risky
shares (median prices in the DA treatment, clearing prices in the CM treatment).
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
CM48/1 211 288 270 294 295 290 287 285 290 280 280 300
CM48/2 150 100 145 160 200 205 225 230 210 231 231 220
CM48/3 300 250 299 300 299 291 292 290 290 293 294 295
CM48/4 200 200 200 180 195 200 210 210 210 210 240 260
CM48/5 500 400 420 300 420 300 300 294 280 300 290 300
CM48/6 200 210 200 210 230 250 240 250 210 250 250 230
CM68/1 170 230 220 . 250 250 260 275 280 278 274 275
CM68/2 250 252 255 255 260 260 260 265 265 266 270 271
CM68/3 300 300 300 320 310 330 320 310 305 300 300 300
CM68/4 231 250 249 230 200 230 250 239 249 250 250 250
CM68/5 260 265 255 256 259 270 270 256 270 275 270 270
CM68/6 260 200 190 205 210 230 239 250 240 248 265 265
DA48/1 149 150 250 270 220 145 160 195 150 155 200 199
DA48/2 250 233 178 175 220 250 240 230 250 250 222 220
DA48/3 150 185 190 199 200 219 195 218 220 220 206 210
DA48/4 172 200 222 225 200 213 205 200 180 185 170 155
DA48/5 180 200 200 210 230 245 240 235 229 225 220 220
DA48/6 175 170 170 178 182 195 190 192 192 190 195 199
DA68/1 200 200 239 220 220 215 215 208 220 216 222 220
DA68/2 500 300 260 288 290 290 283 270 267 270 280 278
DA68/3 200 195 200 240 240 239 240 241 250 250 255 258
DA68/4 199 200 205 215 210 220 223 213 225 210 220 215
DA68/5 215 245 250 240 230 270 250 250 260 250 253 260
DA68/6 150 163 175 195 199 195 199 200 200 200 200 200
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Table 13: Periodical prices for the ambiguous share
For each condition (CM48, CM68, DA48, DA68) the table reports the periodical prices for ambiguous
shares (median prices in the DA, clearing prices in the CM treatment).
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
CM48/1 300 293 290 289 288 300 289 285 283 287 280 300
CM48/2 90 160 161 200 225 250 250 230 220 230 230 220
CM48/3 200 299 287 300 290 290 285 290 290 290 293 295
CM48/4 200 200 200 195 200 200 210 210 210 210 225 225
CM48/5 260 400 400 400 350 350 300 299 300 290 305 300
CM48/6 140 210 180 200 200 205 250 180 210 230 220 250
CM68/1 170 180 200 230 230 250 250 260 270 270 280 275
CM68/2 250 240 250 250 260 255 250 260 260 261 262 265
CM68/3 270 290 310 290 290 300 290 290 290 285 285 285
CM68/4 216 231 230 230 200 250 250 235 249 245 249 231
CM68/5 250 250 250 250 256 259 270 269 263 265 256 265
CM68/6 200 250 215 200 200 220 225 235 250 251 256 245
DA48/1 100 153 240 250 240 150 170 210 150 150 222 199
DA48/2 265 240 161 200 230 249 249 230 249 224 220 230
DA48/3 150 180 185 199 200 210 199 220 225 225 215 210
DA48/4 113 183 210 230 216 200 205 199 178 185 188 200
DA48/5 151 170 190 200 215 230 230 225 220 220 220 220
DA48/6 175 179 170 180 184 193 190 192 191 190 195 195
DA68/1 160 199 195 200 200 210 200 202 210 200 205 216
DA68/2 600 390 290 290 280 260 230 265 270 270 260 279
DA68/3 210 200 210 220 230 238 240 245 249 250 253 259
DA68/4 190 200 201 230 200 223 225 220 220 200 215 220
DA68/5 180 210 245 200 260 260 250 255 260 260 250 260
DA68/6 175 175 175 185 185 195 200 200 200 200 200 200
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Table 14: Periodical data: diﬀerences in volatility
For conditions DA48 and DA68 the table reports the diﬀerences in standard deviations of prices
between the risky asset (R) and of the ambiguous asset (A) for each period.
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
DA48/1 6 150 78 3 -12 7 1 420 -36 -10 -15 12
DA48/2 65 6 56 -151 12 -8 -13 14 -2 -10 16 -17
DA48/3 2 -9 3 -4 -5 -288 1 0 1 360 1 0
DA48/4 -37 11 8 -2 1 -56 171 1 -7 -3 -7 17
DA48/5 45 0 2 -6 18 13 -1 0 38 -118 0 -177
DA48/6 4 10 0 2 -5 -3 -1 15 0 1 -1 1
DA68/1 3 38 24 -6 -7 -46 4 -1 43 -1 -4 29
DA68/2 -132 105 171 -92 124 -169 104 33 3 -7 -5 0
DA68/3 6 7 -1 14 3 -25 3 2 -1 -3 3 1
DA68/4 -4 11 10 21 26 25 41 5 -11 -39 40 2
DA68/5 -34 3 -18 -9 -8 -4 -6 1 2 -4 1 15
DA68/6 38 -2 -9 5 -5 -32 31 17 25 -119 39 -121
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Table 15: Periodical data: diﬀerences in volume
For each condition (CM48, CM68, DA48, DA68) the table reports the diﬀerences in the number of
trades between the risky asset (R) and of the ambiguous asset (A) for each period.
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
CM48/1 1 -3 1 0 2 -2 1 3 1 4 2 0
CM48/2 2 -9 -18 -8 -8 2 -5 3 -7 -1 -3 3
CM48/3 8 -4 1 0 2 -4 0 5 12 -5 3 4
CM48/4 -2 -5 4 1 -7 -4 -2 -2 6 -7 4 -6
CM48/5 2 10 9 -2 3 0 -1 -6 -10 3 0 -6
CM48/6 4 1 9 -10 12 -4 4 10 -7 0 9 -5
CM68/1 -4 -2 5 -18 -8 -10 -4 -12 -1 0 -11 -17
CM68/2 -4 8 -14 -18 3 -3 1 1 -9 7 -4 -20
CM68/3 5 6 -7 13 -7 18 22 1 1 3 -7 -7
CM68/4 -8 -6 -2 -2 1 -18 -5 -4 -9 1 -4 -10
CM68/5 0 -2 -19 0 -3 -17 -6 -17 -19 -2 -9 2
CM68/6 -7 3 -13 5 3 -12 -9 -8 9 -2 10 -2
DA48/1 13 9 34 15 -1 -10 1 -2 -24 -4 12 -5
DA48/2 3 1 -4 -2 3 -12 -10 -2 -4 -10 13 8
DA48/3 -15 9 -14 1 10 -11 2 0 12 -2 4 -5
DA48/4 0 -3 -4 -10 7 -4 -5 8 -17 -4 5 -4
DA48/5 -3 -6 6 0 -2 -2 16 -9 -6 -10 -4 17
DA48/6 -4 2 -4 9 6 -6 -2 -2 12 -3 -4 15
DA68/1 7 0 5 -6 -14 11 -1 7 -3 7 2 17
DA68/2 7 8 10 -6 -7 -12 6 8 -4 -7 4 7
DA68/3 -3 -14 8 -3 -5 -4 -8 -4 -19 -24 -14 -5
DA68/4 12 7 10 -1 16 15 13 -7 -5 -14 7 6
DA68/5 -9 18 -7 -27 -24 -13 -2 -18 5 -23 -9 -9
DA68/6 5 7 -1 -4 -5 0 29 22 7 7 19 10
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Table 16: Executed trades in the risky market
For each condition (CM48, CM68, DA48, DA68) the table reports the number of trades for risky
shares.
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
CM48/1 12 12 6 8 9 9 5 11 11 7 11 9
CM48/2 16 17 10 14 11 20 20 17 15 30 18 13
CM48/3 14 6 15 13 13 11 15 16 20 10 14 21
CM48/4 3 5 10 10 6 16 15 11 15 14 12 12
CM48/5 10 21 21 15 14 15 15 9 13 21 20 20
CM48/6 21 17 18 15 22 15 20 18 9 15 27 10
CM68/1 11 10 19 0 14 7 7 4 5 17 16 16
CM68/2 16 18 16 9 14 10 11 20 10 20 15 14
CM68/3 11 15 3 22 14 24 28 20 10 19 10 19
CM68/4 12 5 13 8 8 8 6 2 10 11 6 10
CM68/5 12 6 6 10 13 13 20 13 16 20 16 30
CM68/6 13 18 10 25 25 10 16 11 22 17 16 18
DA48/1 35 51 73 59 49 29 53 44 35 40 45 39
DA48/2 12 30 17 24 37 31 35 36 35 28 37 42
DA48/3 34 45 35 36 43 24 28 29 34 24 31 29
DA48/4 18 21 13 19 23 19 24 22 4 13 13 8
DA48/5 29 31 33 39 32 30 48 25 25 26 25 35
DA48/6 5 13 12 18 24 9 27 22 31 26 21 42
DA68/1 23 27 42 31 26 36 20 24 19 19 21 25
DA68/2 27 27 31 28 23 22 30 35 28 19 31 33
DA68/3 20 12 30 17 21 24 24 26 22 21 21 30
DA68/4 23 17 22 23 34 27 32 22 14 18 23 22
DA68/5 16 28 25 37 14 29 41 38 35 29 32 29
DA68/6 20 28 31 39 35 31 47 47 33 37 48 33
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Table 17: Executed trades in the ambiguous market
For each condition (CM48, CM68, DA48, DA68) the table reports the number of trades for ambigu-
ous shares.
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
CM48/1 11 15 5 8 7 11 4 8 10 3 9 9
CM48/2 14 26 28 22 19 18 25 14 22 31 21 10
CM48/3 6 10 14 13 11 15 15 11 8 15 11 17
CM48/4 5 10 6 9 13 20 17 13 9 21 8 18
CM48/5 8 11 12 17 11 15 16 15 23 18 20 26
CM48/6 17 16 9 25 10 19 16 8 16 15 18 15
CM68/1 15 12 14 18 22 17 11 16 6 17 27 33
CM68/2 20 10 30 27 11 13 10 19 19 13 19 34
CM68/3 6 9 10 9 21 6 6 19 9 16 17 26
CM68/4 20 11 15 10 7 26 11 6 19 10 10 20
CM68/5 12 8 25 10 16 30 26 30 35 22 25 28
CM68/6 20 15 23 20 22 22 25 19 13 19 6 20
DA48/1 22 42 39 44 50 39 52 46 59 44 33 44
DA48/2 9 29 21 26 34 43 45 38 39 38 24 34
DA48/3 49 36 49 35 33 35 26 29 22 26 27 34
DA48/4 18 24 17 29 16 23 29 14 21 17 8 12
DA48/5 32 37 27 39 34 32 32 34 31 36 29 18
DA48/6 9 11 16 9 18 15 29 24 19 29 25 27
DA68/1 16 27 37 37 40 25 21 17 22 12 19 8
DA68/2 20 19 21 34 30 34 24 27 32 26 27 26
DA68/3 23 26 22 20 26 28 32 30 41 45 35 35
DA68/4 11 10 12 24 18 12 19 29 19 32 16 16
DA68/5 25 10 32 64 38 42 43 56 30 52 41 38
DA68/6 15 21 32 43 40 31 18 25 26 30 29 23
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Table 18: Periodical data of diﬀerences in dispersion of shares
For each condition (CM48, CM68, DA48, DA68) the table reports the diﬀerences in the standard
deviation of end-of-period-stock holdings between the risky asset (R) and of the ambiguous asset
(A) for each period.
Period 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
CM48/1 -1.22 -1.14 0.79 1.14 -0.64 -1.23 0.05 0.61 1.72 0.65 0.95 2.12
CM48/2 0.86 -4.55 -3.42 -1.13 -1.75 2.11 -1.49 0.80 -3.89 -0.09 -1.20 -0.03
CM48/3 0.32 0.74 -0.86 -0.74 -0.27 0.48 -0.99 2.22 1.03 -1.08 0.24 -0.53
CM48/4 -1.09 -2.33 -0.55 0.38 0.80 -1.59 -2.35 -1.92 0.30 -0.69 1.39 -1.06
CM48/5 0.64 1.46 1.97 -2.15 2.36 -0.37 0.82 -3.28 -3.40 1.21 -1.26 -1.86
CM48/6 2.16 -2.74 2.22 -3.12 3.54 -2.45 0.22 2.94 -1.87 0.71 3.00 -2.19
CM68/1 -0.79 -0.57 0.85 -6.81 -1.95 -2.29 -1.79 -2.25 -0.35 -0.52 -2.08 -2.83
CM68/2 -0.65 2.97 -3.20 -4.56 2.02 -1.07 -0.12 0.33 -2.77 0.14 0.41 -2.58
CM68/3 3.08 0.15 -2.48 3.37 -2.29 5.00 5.86 1.09 0.03 -1.78 -2.25 -2.78
CM68/4 -2.38 0.14 1.05 -1.54 -0.27 -4.30 -0.43 -1.03 -2.50 -2.11 -0.55 -3.34
CM68/5 1.75 -1.65 -3.83 1.32 0.78 -1.46 -1.67 -3.16 -2.25 -2.88 -1.13 0.58
CM68/6 -5.33 2.27 -4.40 -0.84 1.15 -4.44 -1.46 -4.79 -0.76 2.06 2.47 -0.60
DA48/1 0.48 -1.96 0.40 -0.74 1.27 1.55 -2.92 -3.17 0.10 0.58 0.98 -0.03
DA48/2 -0.88 -0.09 -0.19 1.95 1.86 0.87 1.19 -0.26 2.15 -1.09 -0.93 0.42
DA48/3 -2.44 -1.10 -1.27 0.33 2.98 3.04 2.37 -0.38 0.22 0.33 -0.79 0.93
DA48/4 0.89 0.75 -1.77 -3.15 1.81 1.47 -2.33 2.82 -3.78 0.40 1.75 -3.73
DA48/5 0.00 4.06 1.36 -3.06 1.84 -1.48 -0.82 0.41 2.08 -0.40 0.03 0.93
DA48/6 0.76 -0.42 -0.93 1.54 -1.53 -1.72 -0.56 -1.48 -0.70 -1.93 -0.09 0.88
DA68/1 0.30 -0.85 2.83 2.83 0.82 0.93 0.88 0.26 -1.93 -1.18 -0.84 0.38
DA68/2 1.65 -1.71 -0.71 -0.66 1.23 1.56 3.44 -0.27 -4.02 -1.54 0.33 0.91
DA68/3 -0.17 -0.61 -0.42 -1.42 1.02 -0.68 -0.38 -2.70 -1.61 -3.38 -3.55 -1.27
DA68/4 2.00 -0.08 2.69 0.66 -0.65 1.63 2.54 -3.63 -2.83 -1.80 1.61 0.23
DA68/5 1.04 0.21 -0.13 -0.21 -0.70 -1.04 1.69 -0.74 -0.88 -2.89 -2.49 -3.10
DA68/6 0.50 -0.36 2.14 -1.44 2.01 -1.09 0.33 3.01 -1.68 -0.40 1.72 0.98
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E Sample of instructions
Translated from German and formatted in a more compact way than in the
actual handouts for the subjects. Note that participants saw the trading screen
and interacted with it while the instructions were being read out aloud. Sections
2, 3, and 4 of the instructions only diﬀer in the number of winning colors. Section
1 of the instructions (Trading in the market) explains the market institution. A
complete set of instructions for DM48 can be found in section E.1. Furthermore,
we provide the instructions for the market instructions of the CM in treatment
in section E.2. The instructions for the call market are basically taken from
Cheung and Palan (2012).
E.1 Instructions DA48
Welcome to the experiment. You are participating in this experiment to earn money.
Accordingly, you should try to maximize the payoﬀ in this experiment. If you follow
the instructions carefully, and if your decisions are good, you will earn a signiﬁcant
amount of money. In this experiment you trade shares. All transactions are calculated
in Taler. At the end of the experiment your total amount earned in Talers will be
exchanged and paid to you at the following exchange rate: 200 Talers = 1 Euro.
1. Trading in the market
The trading of shares will be on a market platform. Thus, you ﬁrst have to gain some
experience with the trading platform. For the trading actions you need Talers and
shares. You ﬁnd your inventory in Talers and shares in the ﬁeld below the trading
platform.
If you want to sell a share, you can use the text box ENTER SELLING PRICE. In
this text box you enter the price at which you are willing to sell the share. Afterwards
you have to click on the SUBMIT button below the text box. Please do this right
now (you can type in any arbitrary price)! Once you have done this, you will recognize
that there are eight prices (one of each participant) recorded in the schedule named
QUOTES TO SELL on the left-hand side. The lowest quote is listed in the ﬁrst row
and it will be emphasized. If you click the BUY button you will buy a share at the
current lowest selling price. If you ﬁrst select another price of the list by clicking on
it, you will buy the share at the selected price. Please buy a share now by clicking on
it and subsequently press the BUY button. Now, everybody should own the same
amount of shares as in the beginning, because all of you have oﬀered one share to sell
and at the same time all of you have purchased one share.
If you want to buy a share, please use the text box ENTER BUYING PRICE. In
this text box you enter the price at which you are willing to buy the share. Afterwards,
click on the SUBMIT button which you can ﬁnd below the text box. Please, do this
right now (you can type in any arbitrary price)! Once you have done this, you will
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recognize that there are eight prices (one of each participant) recorded in the schedule
named QUOTES TO BUY on the right-hand side. The highest quote is listed in
the ﬁrst row and it is emphasized. If you click the SELL button you will sell a share
at the current highest buying price. If you ﬁrst select another price on the list by
clicking on it, you will sell the share at the selected price. Please sell a share now by
clicking on a price and then on the SELL button. Now, everybody should own the
same amount of shares as in the beginning, because all of you have bought one share
and all of you have sold one share.
Remember: if you buy a share, your income is reduced by the purchase price times
the number of shares bought. At the same time the amount of shares owned increases.
If you sell a share, your income increases by the purchase price times the number of
shares bought and your amount of shares owned decreases. The corresponding prices
will be recorded in the list PRICES. The sequence of the prices will depend on the
point in time when the prices are set.
At ﬁrst there will be a two-minutes trial period. The duration of the period will
be displayed in the upper-right-hand corner of the screen. None of your actions in the
trial period will aﬀect your payoﬀ. Thus, these actions will not impact your starting
position in the experiment. The only goal is to gain experience with the trading
platform. Make sure that you have successfully submitted bids to buy and to sell
stocks. Furthermore ensure that you have at least accepted one oﬀer to buy and one
oﬀer to sell. Please feel free to ask questions during the trial period. Thereafter (in
subsequent periods) you will always be given the possibility to ask questions. Keep
in mind: the better you understand the trading platform, the more you can focus on
other important aspects of the experiment.
2. Procedure in one period
In each period you will trade two types of shares in two separate markets: share BLUE
and share YELLOW (this is diﬀerent from the trial period). The markets will be open
for exactly four minutes. At the beginning of each period you will be given a separate
endowment of shares and Talers. At the end of the period all the shares you own will
pay out either 300 or 124 Talers each. This payout will be randomly determined (see
Section 3 for more detailed information ). At the end of each period you will be able
to see the computation of the period's payoﬀ. In total there will be 12 periods.
3. Share payoﬀ
After each period the payoﬀs of the two shares will be determined. Therefore a bag
ﬁlled with marbles will be provided for each share.
Share BLUE: For share BLUE every bag will contain 8 marbles with 8 diﬀerent
colors (white, red, purple, blue, black, brown, bright green, dark green).
Share YELLOW: Each of the bags might contain 1 to 8 diﬀerent colors (white, red,
purple, blue, black, brown, bright green, dark green). There will be a diﬀerent bag for
each period, i.e., a total of 12 diﬀerent bags. All color combinations are possible for
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each bag. Thus, it might happen that one bag contains exactly 8 marbles of the same
color. However, another possibility is that there is one bag which contains exactly one
marble of all 8 colors. All combinations between these two examples might are also
possible.
As you have realized, the bags for the share YELLOW were composed by four
randomly selected persons at the beginning of the experiment. Each of these persons
received three empty bags and were asked to pick eight marbles of almost eight colors.
Thus, these persons had the possibility to ﬁll all of these bags with an arbitrary
composition of the eight colors. Afterwards the bags were closed. Thus, neither you
nor the experimenters know the composition of the marbles in the bags. To ensure that
there are exactly eight marbles in each of the bags, the experimenter will count the
marbles through the fabric of the bags. You can also check this after the experiment
has been ﬁnished if you want. The persons who have composed these bags will not
take part in the experiment. In total there are 12 bags (three bags ﬁlled by each of
the four persons) which will be randomly assigned to the 12 periods before we start
with the trading.
After each period, each share's value will be determined by the following procedure:
At the beginning of the experiment, you marked four colors for the BLUE share and
four colors for the YELLOW share. The selections of colors of the whole group (12 for
share BLUE and 12 for share YELLOW) will be randomly assigned to the 12 periods.
After each period, one participant will draw exactly one marble out of the 'BLUE bag'
which will be used. The drawn marble will be used to determine the payout of the
BLUE share. Furthermore, another participant will also draw exactly one marble out
of the 'YELLOW bag` which was assigned to that period. The drawn marble will be
used to determine the payout of the YELLOW share. For both shares we apply the
following payout procedure: If the drawn marble's color for the BLUE (YELLOW)
share equals one of the four marked colors, then the share's payout is 300 Talers.
Otherwise the payout is 124 Talers. The values will be entered in the experimenter
computer by the supervisor and it will be shown on your screen.
4. Endowment and payoﬀ
At the beginning of each period you will get an endowment as depicted in the table
below. Four participants will receive endowment type I. Furthermore, four participants
will receive endowment type II. These types will be randomly assigned by the computer
at the beginning of each period. At the end of each period you will have to return
3,000 Talers.
Blue market Yellow market
endowment number available number available
type of shares Talers of shares Talers
I 10 4,200 6 5,100
II 6 5,100 10 4,200
55
Talers in the BLUE market can only be used for trading in the BLUE market.
At the same time Talers in the YELLOW market can only be used for trading in the
YELLOW market. At the end of each period, your total payoﬀ (in Talers) is calculated
as: available Talers at the beginning of a period + amount of shares × share payoﬀ
(300 or 124) + Talers earned by selling shares - Talers spent on buying shares - return
of 3000 Talers.
At the end of the experiment, only one period will be paid out in cash. This period
will be determined by a throw of a 12-sided dice. Furthermore, only one market (BLUE
or YELLOW) will be paid out. This market will be determined by a coin toss. Thus,
there is exactly one period (out of all 12 possible periods) of exactly one market (of
share BLUE or YELLOW) which will be paid out to you. Keep in mind that every
decision for each share in each period might be essential for your actual payment! You
receive an additional show-up fee of 4 Euros for your participation in the experiment.
These 4 Euros will be added to your cash payment. The ﬁnal payment in cash is
determined as: Payment (in Euro) = Taler payoﬀ/200 + 4 Euros (show-up fee).
E.2 Instructions CM: 1. Trading in the market
The trading of the assets will be on a market platform. Thus, you ﬁrst have to
gain experience with the trading platform. For the trading actions you need Talers
and shares. You ﬁnd your inventory in Talers and shares in the ﬁeld below the trading
platform. In each period, you will see four input areas to buy and sell the assets.
If you want to sell shares, enter the number of shares you are willing to sell in the
ﬁeld: Number of shares to sell. Afterwards enter the lowest price you are willing to
sell the shares. If you want to buy shares then you make purchase oﬀers by entering
the number of shares you are willing to buy in the ﬁeld Number of shares to buy.
Afterwards enter the highest price you are willing to pay for the shares.
In each period you have the possibility to post sell and buy oﬀers. The price
you are willing to buy must be below the price you are willing to sell. The price
you post corresponds to one share. At the same time if you sell shares you will
get the selling price × number of sold shares. If you buy shares you will get: the
purchase price× number of bought shares. As soon as you click the OK button,
the sell and buy oﬀers will be submitted and cannot be changed anymore.
The computer applies the sell and buy oﬀers of all market participants to
determine the market price. All transactions in this period will be processed
at this price. This price will be chosen such that the number of shares where
sell oﬀers were below or equal this price is of the same number as of the shares
where buy oﬀers where higher or equal this price.
The market participants who submitted buy oﬀers which are higher than
this price, will buy at this price. Their money endowment will be reduced by
the product of market price x number of shares bought. Furthermore their
asset endowment will be increased by the number of assets bought. The market
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participants who submitted sell oﬀers below this price will sell at this price.
Their money endowment will be increased by the product of market price x
number of shares sold. Furthermore, their asset endowment will be decreased
by the number of shares sold.
In the following you have to launch sell and buy oﬀers for trial purposes.
None of these practicing actions will inﬂuence your payoﬀs in this experiment.
This is why it will not aﬀect your position later in the experiment. Here, the
goal is to familiarize you with the platform only. Therefore you have to launch
sell and buy oﬀers three times in a row. Afterwards there will be a brief clearing
each time. Feel free to ask questions during the trial period. Afterwards (in
later periods) you will always have the possibility to ask questions. Keep in
mind, the better you understand the platform, the more you can concentrate
on the essential parts of the experiment.
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